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ABSTRACT
This Article focuses on the power and corporate governance significance of
the three largest index fund managers commonly referred to collectively as the
“Big Three.” We present current evidence on the substantial voting power of
the Big Three and explain why it is likely to persist and, indeed, further grow.
We show that, due to their voting power, the Big Three have considerable
influence on corporate outcomes through both what they do and what they fail
to do. We also discuss the Big Three’s undesirable incentives both to underinvest
in stewardship and to be excessively deferential to corporate managers.
In the course of our analysis, we reply to responses and challenges to our
earlier work on these issues that have been put forward by high-level officers of
the Big Three and by a significant number of prominent academics. We show
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that these attempts to downplay Big Three power or the problems with their
incentives do not hold up to scrutiny. We conclude by discussing the substantial
stakes in this debate—the critical importance of recognizing the power of the
Big Three, and why it matters.
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INTRODUCTION
The three largest index fund managers—BlackRock, Inc. (“BlackRock”);
State Street Global Advisors, a division of State Street Corporation (“SSGA”);
and the Vanguard Group (“Vanguard”)—collectively known as the “Big Three,”
own an increasingly large proportion of American public companies.1
Consequently, the stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they
monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—are likely to have a
profound impact on the governance and performance of public companies and
the economy. The nature and quality of Big Three stewardship are therefore now
the subject of a heated ongoing debate.2
Under a traditional “value-maximization” account of Big Three stewardship,
the stewardship decisions of index fund managers are premised to be largely
focused on maximizing the long-term value of their investment portfolios, and
agency problems are thus assumed not to be a first-order driver of those
decisions. By contrast, in our earlier work we have sought to put forward an
alternative “agency-costs” account of index fund stewardship: In a 2019
Columbia Law Review article, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy (“Index Fund Incentives”), we
analyzed the incentives that shape, and the distortions that afflict, the
stewardship choices made by the Big Three.3 In addition, in a 2019 Boston
University Law Review article, The Specter of the Giant Three, we provided
empirical evidence on the rise of the Big Three and their likely future growth.4
Our work, and especially the incentive analysis in Index Fund Incentives, built
on the framework for analyzing the agency problems of institutional investors
we had earlier put forward in a study with Alma Cohen.5
In this Article, we seek to contribute empirically and conceptually to the
development of the agency-costs account. In particular, we seek to address a
wide array of objections and challenges to the agency-costs view that have been
put forward both by high-level officers of the Big Three and a number of leading
academics.6 Objections to our agency-costs view from the direction of the Big
Three were expressed in a keynote address by BlackRock’s then Vice Chairman

1

See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
3
See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019) [hereinafter
Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives].
4
See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 721 (2019) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, Giant Three].
5
See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89 (2017) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst,
Agency Problems].
6
See infra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
2
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Barbara Novick.7 Responses to our work included a study issued by
BlackRock’s then Vice Chairman Matthew Mallow,8 conference presentations
by SSGA’s then Chief Investment Officer (“CIO”) Richard Lacaille,9 and by
Vanguard’s former Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) William McNabb.10
Comments on our work were provided to the Financial Times and to The Wall
Street Journal by SSGA’s then Managing Director of Environmental, Social,
and Governance Investments and Asset Stewardship, Rakhi Kumar, and by
BlackRock and Vanguard spokespersons.11 These responses by various Big
Three officers sought to challenge our conclusions regarding the power of the
Big Three, as well as our criticism of how the Big Three use their power.
Analysis taking issue with our agency-costs account of Big Three stewardship
was put forward in articles by Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock (both from
NYU);12 by Jill Fisch (University of Pennsylvania), Assaf Hamdani (Tel-Aviv
University), and Steven Davidoff Solomon (University of California,
Berkeley);13 and by Jeff Gordon (Columbia University).14 Whereas these articles

7
See generally Barbara Novick, Vice Chairman, BlackRock, Inc., Keynote Address at
Harvard Law School (Nov. 6, 2019), in BLACKROCK, REVISED AND EXTENDED REMARKS AT
HARVARD ROUNDTABLE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KEYNOTE ADDRESS: “THE GOLDILOCKS
DILEMMA”
(2019)
[hereinafter
Novick
Keynote
Address],
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/barbara-novick-remarksharvard-roundtable-corporate-governance-the-goldilocks-dilemma-110619.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VB55-3X55], reprinted in Barbara Novick, “The Goldilocks Dilemma”: A
Response to Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 80 (2020). A video of
the address is also available online. Tami Groswald Ozery, Harvard L. Sch., Barbara Novick’s
Keynote Address at Harvard Law School, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 11,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/11/barbara-novicks-keynote-presentationat-harvard-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/8AJ6-6RUG].
8
See Matthew J. Mallow, Asset Management, Index Funds, and Theories of Corporate
Control 29-33 (Nov. 12, 2019), (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3483573 [https://perma.cc/9H8D-XHT7]).
9
For a video of Lacaille’s comments, see ECGI, Rethinking Stewardship, YOUTUBE at
0:50:17-1:01:36
(Oct.
23,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtMulZ9AOfE[hereinafter Lacaille Video].
10
For McNabb’s comments, see id. at 2:17:18-2:32:26.
11
For the media articles reporting such comments in response to our work, see Owen
Walker, BlackRock, Vanguard and SSGA Tighten Hold on US Boards, FIN. TIMES (June 15,
2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/046ec082-d713-3015-beaf-c7fa42f3484a; and
Simon Constable, Index-Fund Firms Gain Power, but Fall Short in Stewardship, Research
Shows, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2019, 10:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-fundfirms-gain-power-but-fall-short-in-stewardship-research-shows-11562637900.
12
See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1771, 1787-88 (2020).
13
See Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall
Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 20 (2019).
14
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript
at
2)
(available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3782814
[https://perma.cc/TXV9-BUTM]).
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do not seek to downplay the power of the Big Three, they challenge our agencycosts account by putting forward a more favorable assessment of Big Three
stewardship, or at least some key dimensions of it.15
This Article responds to this wide array of objections and challenges. To this
end, we provide additional analysis and evidence in support of the agency-costs
account of Big Three stewardship. Our analysis reinforces the view that, despite
the protestations of the Big Three senior officers challenging our conclusions,
the Big Three have considerable power and influence on corporate decisions and
outcomes. Furthermore, notwithstanding the claims of our academic critics, our
analysis reinforces the conclusions that the stewardship decisions of the Big
Three are substantially afflicted by distorted incentives.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I considers the arguments made by
critics of our empirical analyses of the Big Three’s power. We put forward
evidence showing that our conclusions regarding the Big Three’s substantial
voting power remain intact after addressing the empirical issues and challenges
raised by critics.16 We also update the estimates reported in our previous work;
in particular, we estimate that, as of the end of 2021, the Big Three collectively
held a median stake of 21.9% in S&P 500 companies, which represented a
proportion of 24.9% of the votes cast at the annual meetings of those companies.
Finally, Part I also engages with objections regarding the likely future growth of
the Big Three, and it shows that the power of the Big Three is likely to persist
and even significantly grow in the foreseeable future.17
Part II examines how the Big Three’s voting power and their use of that power
has important effects on corporate decisions and outcomes. This analysis is
divided into two parts. Section II.A analyzes how the Big Three’s voting
influences actual and potential voting results. In response to the objection that
the proxy solicitor Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) exerts
considerable influence on votes,18 we explain that the proportion of votes that
ISS influences is less than the proportion of shares held by the Big Three. In
response to the objection that the Big Three do not act as a cohesive voting bloc
and often vote differently,19 we explain that the votes of the Big Three show
significant correlation. Finally, in response to the objection that even a 10%
voting block is unlikely to have significant influence because close votes are
15
For another significant article worth noting, see generally John C. Coates, The Future
of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Harvard Pub. L. Working Paper
No. 19-07, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3247337 [https://perma.cc/2UAB-PT2Q].
This study is critical of Big Three stewardship, as we are, but its concern is that the Big Three
(and other large institutional investors) will make excessive use of their power. See id. at 2.
Our conclusions in this Article regarding the Big Three’s incentives to underinvest in
stewardship and to be excessively deferential to corporate managers are also responsive to the
analysis of this study.
16
See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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infrequent,20 we explain that there are significant situations in which index fund
votes could determine whether a vote passes or not, both for proxy contests and
for environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) matters. And even where
votes are not close, the outcome of votes can play an important part in
influencing the behavior of corporate managers.
Section II.B then analyzes how actual and potential voting outcomes, in turn,
influence corporate decisions and outcomes. In response to the objection that
vote outcomes have a limited effect on corporate outcomes because they are
often advisory and because shareholder decisions are made by a collective group
of thousands of different investors,21 we explain that even advisory votes can
influence the actions of corporate managers in important ways because it is
important for incumbent directors to retain large support from shareholders and
to avoid any visible disagreement with a substantial group of shareholders.
Consequently, the voting decisions of shareholders holding large voting power,
whether in advisory or binding votes, have substantial influence on corporate
decisions.
Part III reviews how the power and importance of the Big Three is perceived
and described by market participants. To the extent that market participants view
Big Three positions as important, we explain, those views alone give the Big
Three significant influence, irrespective of their actual ability to influence
corporate elections. A belief in the power of the Big Three by corporate
managers, even if misplaced, would make corporate managers make decisions
that are influenced by the preferences of Big Three managers.
Section III.A documents that management advisors indeed view the Big Three
as very important. Section III.B in turn documents that some of the
communications by the Big Three themselves reflect this perception as well; for
example, communications by the Big Three promoting the success of their
engagements on subjects like board diversity make clear that they are aware of
the significant influence they are able to exert over the directors and executives
of corporations.22 Our analysis of the perceptions of market participants thus
reinforces our earlier conclusion that the Big Three exercise significant
influence.
Part IV considers the two incentive problems of index fund managers,
which—as we explain—have not been adequately addressed by those defending
index fund managers.23 The first incentive problem, which we discuss in Section
IV.A, is that index fund managers have incentives to underinvest in stewardship
activities. Index fund managers bear the costs of stewardship, but their own
20

See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 159-61, 165-66 and accompanying text.
23
Our analysis of these incentive problems builds on our discussion in Index Fund
Incentives, which in turn built on earlier analysis of these incentives in The Agency Problems
of Institutional Investors. For a discussion of incentives to underinvest in stewardship and be
excessively deferential, see Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 205071; and Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, Agency Problems, supra note 5, at 96-104.
21
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investors enjoy the gains that result from those activities. Index fund managers
themselves only capture a very small part of those gains, in the form of the small
proportion of their investors’ assets that they charge as fees. As a result, index
fund managers have an incentive to invest considerably less in stewardship than
their own investors would prefer. We show that arguments raised by critics that
investment managers benefit from stewardship by attracting additional assets, or
because of the size or breadth of their holdings, are unlikely to provide the Big
Three with sufficient incentives to undertake substantial stewardship.
The second incentive problem, which we discuss in Section IV.B, is that index
fund managers also have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate
managers compared to what would be optimal for their own investors. This is
because index funds are likely to bear several different types of costs from
nondeferential actions, including lost business from corporate managers,
compliance costs that would be borne by investment managers if they influence
the control of portfolio companies, and the possibility of a corporate-led
backlash to their considerable power. As we explain, the Big Three have
expressed doubt regarding these claims, but neither they nor academic
commentators have raised any arguments why this is unlikely to be the case.24
Finally, Part V discusses the significant stakes involved in this issue. The Big
Three’s growing power creates the promise that they could overcome the
problems with dispersed ownership of corporations and the limited ability of
small shareholders to influence corporate managers. The Big Three’s incentive
problems are important because they leave this promise unfulfilled. This is
especially important because of the lack of any corrective mechanisms that
would reward the Big Three for good stewardship decisions and thereby lead
them to improve their stewardship performance. If they do not do so, corporate
managers are likely to continue to be insulated from challenges by investors,
even when such insulation is not warranted. This will be the case if attempts by
the Big Three to downplay their power are taken at face value. Instead, the power
and potential of the Big Three should be fully recognized, and the Big Three
should be encouraged to fulfill that potential.
I.

VOTING POWER

This Part presents evidence regarding the voting power of the Big Three,
updating and expanding the estimates presented in our earlier work.25 Section
I.A considers the current voting power of the Big Three, and Section I.B
considers how this voting power can be expected to change in the future. In the
course of our discussion below, we pay especially close attention to the
objections raised by BlackRock’s Vice-Chairs Mallow and Novick and SSGA’s
CIO Lacaille.

24

See infra notes 201-19.
In Giant Three, we presented estimates based on data through the end of 2019. In this
Article, we present estimates based on data through the end of 2021.
25
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A.

At Present
Both Mallow and Novick include data regarding the current voting power of
the Big Three. Novick claims that, as of December 2017, the Big Three
collectively managed 10% of global equity.26 However, the data cited by Novick
relates to “global equity market capitalization.”27 Our focus is on understanding
the U.S. corporate governance system, and we therefore focus on U.S.
companies, S&P 500 companies in particular, which represent more than 70%
of total stock market capitalization.28
Mallow argues that index mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”)
“represented only 17% of U.S. stock market capitalization as of year-end
2018.”29 However, this ignores the value of actively managed funds that are also
controlled by the Big Three, which is likely to explain the discrepancy between
Mallow’s figures for all index mutual funds and ETFs and the figures below and
in our prior work related to the holdings of the Big Three.30
Whereas our earlier work presented estimates through the end of 2019, we
now have data for about two more years, through the end of 2021. Table 1
presents estimates of the median ownership percentage of each of the Big Three
in S&P 500 companies from 2000 to 2021.31

26
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 2 exhibit 2 (showing Vanguard, BlackRock,
and SSGA owned 4%, 4%, and 2% of global equity, respectively). The CIO of SSGA has also
downplayed SSGA’s voting power. See Lacaille Video, supra note 9, at 54:57-55:10
(“Collectively our clients are minority investors . . . we don’t dominate, in any stretch of the
imagination, decision-making from a proxy voting perspective.”).
27
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 2 exhibit 2.
28
As of December 31, 2021, the market capitalization of S&P 500 companies constituted
71.4% of the total capitalization of U.S. companies, excluding exchange-traded funds
(“ETFs”) and closed-end funds. Data is calculated from the Center for Research in Securities
Prices, LLC (“CRSP”).
29
Mallow, supra note 8, at 13-14.
30
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2050 n.51
(presenting evidence that, in 2017, the proportion of assets invested by the Big Three in index
funds fell short of 100%, at “79% for SSGA, 74% for Vanguard, and 66% for BlackRock”).
31
Table 1 aggregates holdings for all entities with a version of “BlackRock,” “Vanguard,”
or “State Street” in their names, plus those of five other entities acquired by or associated with
BlackRock (Barclays Global Asset Management, Barclays Global Investors UK Holdings
Ltd., Merrill Lynch Investment Managers, Inc., State Street Research & Management Co.,
and iShares (DE) Invag Mit Teilgesellschaftsvermogen). Institutional ownership data is taken
from the FactSet 13F Institutional Ownership database, and thus updates the data on which
we relied in our earlier work. Positions for each year represented in the table are as of
December 31 of that year. Data is limited to companies in the S&P 500 index as of that date.
S&P 500 constituent data is taken from CRSP. The median position for each investment
manager in that year is calculated as the median of their holdings in S&P 500 companies
divided by the outstanding shares of those companies. Estimated medians are rounded to one
decimal place; totals in the final column are the sum of the rounded medians.
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Table 1. Estimated Median Big Three Ownership of S&P 500 Companies, 20002021.
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

BlackRock
3.7%
3.8%
3.8%
4.2%
4.4%
4.1%
4.2%
4.5%
5.1%
5.6%
5.5%
5.5%
5.5%
5.7%
5.9%
6.1%
6.4%
6.8%
7.0%
7.5%
7.4%
7.7%

Vanguard
1.5%
1.7%
1.7%
2.0%
2.2%
2.4%
2.7%
3.0%
3.3%
3.6%
3.9%
4.3%
4.8%
5.5%
6.1%
6.6%
7.4%
8.4%
9.2%
9.5%
9.4%
9.7%

SSGA
1.9%
2.2%
2.6%
2.9%
3.0%
2.9%
2.9%
3.3%
3.9%
3.7%
3.8%
3.8%
4.2%
4.4%
4.5%
4.1%
4.5%
4.3%
4.3%
4.5%
4.3%
4.5%

Total
7.1%
7.7%
8.1%
9.1%
9.6%
9.4%
9.8%
10.8%
12.3%
12.9%
13.2%
13.6%
14.5%
15.6%
16.5%
16.8%
18.3%
19.5%
20.5%
21.5%
21.1%
21.9%

Novick faults our work for being based on Form 13F filings, which she claims
are not reliable.32 In particular, she claims that Form 13F filings are
underinclusive because individuals are not required to submit Form 13F
filings.33 However, this criticism is unwarranted. We use Form 13F data for Big
Three holdings, but not for the total number of shares of the company. That is,
only the numerators of our estimates—the number of shares held by the Big
Three—derive from Form 13F data. This is reasonable because, given that they
are each well above the threshold for Form 13F filing, the Big Three are required
to report their holdings on Form 13F.34 The denominator in our estimates—the
32

For this criticism by Novick, see Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 3.
See id. (“[N]ot all investors are required to file Form 13F. . . . The bottom line is 13F
data problems potentially invalidate academic analyses that rely on this data.”).
34
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2021) (requiring filing on Form 13F by “every institutional
investment manager which exercises investment discretion with respect to accounts holding
section 13(f) securities, as defined in paragraph (c) of this section, having an aggregate fair
33
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total number of shares of the company, held by all investors—comes from the
total number of outstanding shares reported by the corporation, which includes
shares held by investors which do not file Form 13F.35 We note that neither
Mallow nor Novick engage with an important point: the voting power of the Big
Three is actually substantially greater than the number of shares that they hold.
This is because the Big Three consistently vote the shares they hold, whereas a
substantial proportion of other investors do not vote their shares.36 As a result,
the Big Three’s shares represent a much greater proportion of the shares that are
actually voted at annual meetings. Table 2 shows the median of the estimated
number of shares with voting power held by the Big Three represented as a
proportion of the votes cast at each S&P 500 company’s annual meeting from
2007 to 2021.37 As of the end of 2021, we estimate that BlackRock and
Vanguard held a median of 9.8% and 12.0%, respectively, of the votes cast at
annual meetings, and the Big Three collectively held a median of 27.6% of votes
cast at annual meetings.

market value on the last trading day of any month of any calendar year of at least
$100,000,000”).
35
For further details on how our previous calculations were performed, see
Bebchuk & Hirst, Giant Three, supra note 4, at 733 n.28.
36
See id. at 738-40.
37
Table 2 is calculated using the same ownership and S&P 500 constituent data and
general approach as Table 1, supra note 31. For each of the Big Three, as of the end of each
year from 2007 to 2021, Table 2 shows the average, across all of the companies in its portfolio
at the end of that year, of the holding of the investment manager divided by the number of
votes cast in director elections at the annual meeting of that company. To calculate this, the
holdings of that manager in each company in the S&P 500 are first divided by the number of
votes represented at the company’s annual meeting (i.e., those voted for, against, and those
that abstained) in the subsequent year, then those results are averaged for each manager and
year. The number of votes cast at annual meetings of companies is obtained from FactSet
SharkRepellent. Estimated medians are rounded to one decimal place; totals in the final
column are the sum of the rounded medians.
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Table 2. Estimated Median Big Three Ownership of S&P 500 Companies, as a
Proportion of Total Votes at Annual Meetings, 2007-2021.
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

BlackRock
5.2%
6.1%
7.5%
7.3%
7.2%
7.3%
7.5%
7.6%
8.0%
8.3%
8.8%
9.2%
9.6%
9.5%
9.8%

Vanguard
3.5%
3.9%
5.0%
5.5%
6.0%
6.6%
7.5%
8.1%
8.9%
10.0%
10.9%
11.8%
12.4%
11.8%
12.0%

SSGA
3.8%
4.5%
4.9%
5.0%
5.0%
5.5%
5.7%
5.7%
5.4%
5.8%
5.7%
5.5%
5.7%
5.5%
5.7%

Total
12.5%
14.5%
17.4%
17.8%
18.2%
19.4%
20.7%
21.4%
22.3%
24.1%
25.4%
26.5%
27.7%
26.8%
27.5%

Both Mallow and Novick argue that, in assessing the power of the Big Three,
it is important to take into account that some institutional investors investing
through large separate accounts with BlackRock retain their voting rights.38
However, there are reasons to believe that, during the period that we study, this
point has applied to a relatively small minority of the shares held by the Big
Three. To begin, much of the assets of the Big Three come from investors in
ETFs or from retail investors investing in mutual funds that do not retain the
right to vote. To illustrate, at the end of 2021, 46% of BlackRock’s assets under
management were from retail investors or were in ETFs.39 The votes of these
mutual funds and ETFs are cast by the investment managers.40 Furthermore,

38

See Mallow, supra note 8, at 10 (“Institutional clients with segregated accounts can
delegate voting to the asset manager or they can retain the right to vote themselves, as many
institutions do.”); Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 3 (“[Q]uite a few large
institutional asset owners outsource the management of their assets while choosing to vote
proxies for themselves.”).
39
BlackRock, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3-4 (Feb. 25, 2022) (stating that at the end of
2021 retail represented 11% of long-term assets under management and ETFs represented
35%).
40
Votes cast by these funds are generally recommended by the investment manager, who
also implements the votes after they have been approved by the directors or trustees of the
mutual fund or ETF. See Dawn Lim & Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposal Seeks Transparency in
How Money Managers Wield Vast Voting Power, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2021, 4:10 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-proposal-seeks-transparency-in-how-money-managerswield-vast-voting-power-11632928496.
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even for non-ETF assets that are invested by institutional investors with the Big
Three, some of those assets are invested in commingled funds, rather than
through separate accounts. And even for the assets that are invested in separate
accounts, Novick estimated that only 25% of those separate accounts were
managed for clients that managed their own shares.41
Notably, Novick does not provide any estimate of the fraction of assets
managed by BlackRock whose votes are directed by beneficial investors. And
to the best of our knowledge, during the period we examine, none of the Big
Three disclosed what this fraction was for their assets under management. Given
the incentives that the Big Three have to downplay their voting power, which
we discuss in Section V.D, the choice of the Big Three not to disclose the
percentage of assets for which votes are directed by beneficial investors is
consistent with the possibility that the amount represents a relatively small
minority of their assets under management. We note that earlier this year,
BlackRock implemented a new program aimed at facilitating and expanding
voting decisions by institutional clients that invest with BlackRock.42 But even
after the introduction of this program, entitled “Voting Choice,” and the
resulting expansion in the number of institutional clients providing voting
instructions, BlackRock indicated that only about 10% of its index equity assets
under management are in the hands of beneficial investors that provide
instructions for how shares should be voted.43 Furthermore, some of these
beneficial investors employ a “hybrid” approach under which they provide
voting instructions only in selected cases, leaving voting to BlackRock in the
remaining cases.44 Vanguard and SSGA do not have such programs, so the
fraction of their index equity investments with client-directed voting is likely to
be even smaller.

41
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 3 (“We estimate that 25% of BlackRock’s
large separate account mandates are managed for clients who vote their own shares.”).
42
See Dawn Lim, BlackRock Gives Big Investors Ability to Vote on Shareholder
Proposals, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2021, 1:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrockgives-big-investors-ability-to-vote-on-shareholder-proposals-11633617321.
43
See BlackRock Expands Voting Choice to Additional Clients, BLACKROCK (June 13,
2022),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/newsroom/press-releases/article/corporateone/press-releases/2022-blackrock-voting-choice [https://perma.cc/QXS5-MWBP] (“Clients
representing 25% ($530 billion) of eligible index equity assets ($2.3 trillion) have elected to
participate in BlackRock Voting Choice.”). This represents 11% of BlackRock’s $4.9 trillion
in total index equity assets under management at the time. See BLACKROCK, IT’S ALL ABOUT
CHOICE 7 (2022), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/its-all-aboutchoice.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL8E-3JLK]. That denominator does not include non-index
equity assets managed by BlackRock, so as a proportion all of their assets under management
the proportion will be smaller than 11%.
44
For a description of the Voting Choice program’s hybrid approach to voting, see
BLACKROCK, supra note 43, at 15.
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In the Future
This Article has so far focused on the current power of the Big Three. In this
Section we focus on how the power of the Big Three can be expected to change
in the future. In our prior work, we estimated the mean percentage of S&P 500
shares likely to be held by the Big Three over the next two decades and the
proportion that these shares are likely to represent out of the total number of
shares voted at the meetings of those companies.45 The proportion of the equity
of S&P 500 companies not managed by the Big Three has declined from 86.5%
in 2008 to 79.5% in 2017, an average annual decline of 0.84%.46 Extrapolating
this decline into the future, the Big Three can be expected to hold an estimated
27.6% of the shares of S&P 500 companies in 2028 and 33.4% in 2038.47 Similar
increases hold for the Russell 3000—if current trends continue, the Big Three
can be expected to hold an estimated 23.9% of the shares of Russell 3000
companies in 2028 and 30.1% in 2038.48
When the fact that many other shareholders do not vote at annual meetings is
taken into account, the voting power exercised by the Big Three is likely to be
even greater.49 In our prior work, we calculated that an average of 73% of shares
not held by the Big Three were voted in director elections from 2008 to 2017.50
Assuming that proportion remains constant, we further estimated that the Big
Three will hold 34.3% of S&P 500 votes in 2028 and 40.8% of S&P 500 votes
in 2038.51 We obtained similar estimates for the Russell 3000: 29.8% of Russell
3000 votes in 2028 and 36.7% of Russell 3000 votes in 2038.52
Mallow and Novick cast doubt on our predictions regarding the growth of
index funds. In particular, Novick stated the following:
In the Specter of the Giant Three, Bebchuk and Hirst assume that these
managers will continue to grow at the rate they have for the past few years.
While their projections are arithmetically correct, this assumption ignores
multiple external variables that can change what products, asset classes, or
managers are in or out of favor at a given time, and that translates into
changes in growth rates.53
Novick argues that many organizations that were among the largest in 1990
are no longer in existence, and many of the largest asset managers in 2000,
including Deutsche Asset Management and PIMCO, are no longer among the

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

See Bebchuk & Hirst, Giant Three, supra note 4, at 737-41.
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
Bebchuk & Hirst, Giant Three, supra note 4, at 739.
Id.
Id.
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 3 (footnote omitted).
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largest.54 Both Mallow and Novick point to evidence that the growth rate of other
asset managers in 2018 surpassed that of the Big Three.55 Mallow and Novick
thus imply that the proportion of votes cast by the Big Three might not trend
upwards as much as we have predicted, or that it might decline.56
We agree that the growth rates we use for our predictions are not certain;
indeed, we emphasized in The Specter of the Giant Three the old adage that “it
is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.”57 However, as we
discuss below, continued growth of the Big Three is very plausible, even if not
completely certain, and this is a scenario that policymakers should seriously
consider. Mallow and Novick highlight the uncertainty of the growth rates we
use, but they do not question the plausibility of the scenario we put forward.
There have been two steady and persistent trends over the past twenty-five
years—the growth of institutional investors and the increasing proportion of
institutional investment managed through index funds.58 Given that both of these
trends have been so steady and consistent, there is a substantial chance that they
will continue for some time. This is especially the case where the trends can be
explained by clear drivers.
One such driver is the advantage that index investing holds over other
strategies. Mallow himself recognizes these benefits as reasons for investors to
invest in index funds, explaining that “[d]iversification, and obtaining it at a low
cost, is the fundamental benefit and a primary reason for the popularity of index
investing,”59 and that “the use of index funds as a core investment vehicle has
significantly increased, in part because they provide diversification and
benchmark returns at a low cost.”60
We agree with Mallow that these factors are likely to lead to the increase in
the amount of investment using an indexing strategy. It is of course possible that
the Big Three may lose their dominance of index fund management and, as
Mallow suggests, that the inflows to indexing may go instead to other index fund

54

Id. (noting certain top-ten asset managers by assets under management in 1990 and 2000
that are no longer in the top ten).
55
See Mallow, supra note 8, at 13 (explaining that in 2018 the Big Three “were not,
however, the fastest growing among well-known top 30 asset managers,” and providing
examples of other large asset managers with higher growth rates that year); Novick Keynote
Address, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing Dimensional Fund Advisors’ 9% growth rate).
56
See Mallow, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that “future growth [in asset management] is
neither certain nor predictable, especially with regards to individual firms over time”); Novick
Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing estimates in Giant Three and noting that those
statistics could change based on multiple external variables).
57
Bebchuk & Hirst, Giant Three, supra note 4, at 737.
58
See id. at 725-28 (discussing the rise of institutional investors since 1950 and the
increasing share of institutional investment managed through index funds from 1995 to 2015).
59
Mallow, supra note 8, at 9.
60
Id. at 14.
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managers.61 However, as we discuss in our prior work, this is unlikely to occur
for structural reasons.
To begin, there are significant economies of scale to index fund operations.62
These not only benefit the Big Three at the expense of potential entrants, but
they incentivize the Big Three to continue growing. A second, related reason is
that larger ETFs can be expected to have greater liquidity (shown in their lower
bid-ask spreads) and thus lower costs to investors.63 This further incentivizes
investors to invest in ETFs that are already larger and that are generally managed
by the Big Three. This can also be expected to lead to the continuing growth of
those ETFs.64 Finally, the nature of index fund offerings means that even if an
upstart rival were to offer a new product to compete with the Big Three, the Big
Three could swiftly replicate that product, making it difficult for the potential
competitor to take market share from them. Mallow and Novick do not address
these structural factors which provide a basis for believing that the Big Three’s
dominance of the growing sector of index investing is likely to persist.
*****
This Part has demonstrated that the Big Three currently control substantial
stakes in U.S. corporations and even greater proportions of the voting power in
those corporations. Furthermore, their power can be expected not just to
continue, but to potentially grow even stronger—possibly transforming them
into the “Giant Three.”65 For the reasons we explain in this Article’s subsequent
parts, this considerable power means that the behavior and incentives of the Big
Three have significant implications for corporate outcomes and for corporate
governance, and so should attract special attention from scholars and
policymakers.
II.

INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE OUTCOMES

In seeking to downplay the power of the Big Three, BlackRock’s Mallow and
Novick and SSGA’s Lacaille argue that, notwithstanding the significant share of
votes cast by the Big Three, our work overstates the extent to which the Big
Three can influence corporate outcomes.66 Lacaille argues that the Big Three

61

See supra note 56.
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Giant Three, supra note 4, at 729 (explaining how larger ETFs
have lower operational costs as a percentage of assets).
63
See id. (describing how larger ETFs offer investors significant liquidity advantages).
64
See id. at 729-30 (explaining how economies of scale and greater liquidity are likely to
enable the Big Three to retain their dominance over time).
65
See id.
66
See Mallow, supra note 8, at 5; Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 1; Lacaille
Video, supra note 9, at 54:15-55:40.
62
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“don’t dominate . . . decision-making from a proxy voting perspective.”67
Mallow and Novick provide a detailed analysis suggesting that the Big Three
have a limited effect on the results of corporate votes68 and that corporate
outcomes are largely determined by factors other than the results of corporate
votes.69 We discuss both types of claims in turn. Section II.A discusses claims
that the Big Three have limited power to influence voting results. Section II.B
discusses claims that those voting results have limited effects on corporate
outcomes.
A.

The Effect of the Big Three on Voting Results

Mallow and Novick make three arguments in an effort to downplay the impact
of the Big Three on voting results. In each of the three subsections below we
discuss, in turn, the arguments that (1) proxy advisors play a significant role in
affecting voting results, (2) investment managers do not coordinate their voting,
and (3) close votes where Big Three votes may be particularly influential are
relatively rare.
1. Dominated by the Influence of Proxy Advisors?
Mallow and Novick argue that proxy advisors, especially ISS, exert
significant control over the outcomes of corporate votes. For instance, Mallow
argues that “many other stakeholders play a role in corporate governance,
including most prominently, proxy advisors and compensation consultants.”70
Novick points to evidence that “negative [ISS] recommendations drive a 25%
decrease in support for say-on-pay proposals.”71 Mallow suggests that “proxy
advisory firms’ recommendations determine between 20-30% of the vote among
institutional investors who lack their own investment stewardship teams.”72
Other releases by BlackRock echo this view.73
67

See Lacaille Video, supra note 9, at 54:57-55:10 (stating, in reference to the Big Three,
that “collectively our clients are minority investors” and “we don’t dominate, in any stretch
of the imagination, decision-making from a proxy voting perspective”).
68
See, e.g., Mallow, supra note 8, at 19-22 (arguing that “[a]sset managers are minority
shareholders with limited voting power and corporate control”); Novick Keynote Address,
supra note 7, at 5-7 (downplaying BlackRock’s influence on executive compensation votes).
69
See, e.g., Mallow, supra note 8, at 29 (“Focusing solely on [index fund
managers] . . . omit[s] the pronounced role of company executives in running our nation’s
public companies and boards of directors in holding company management accountable.”);
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that there are over 28,000 unique
individuals involved in running and setting strategy at US companies, including nearly 4,000
CEOs and over 24,000 board directors).
70
Mallow, supra note 8, at 14.
71
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 6.
72
Mallow, supra note 8, at 23.
73
See, e.g., BLACKROCK, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC COMPANY
SHAREHOLDERS 4 (2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-
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However, there is evidence to suggest that the actual power of proxy advisors
is less than Mallow and Novick suggest. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, and Marcel
Kahan have presented evidence that proxy advisors have substantially less
influence than Novick claims.74 Of course, if Mallow and Novick argue that the
ability of proxy advisory firms to influence 25% of votes cast in elections is
“significant” then they should also admit that the collective power of the Big
Three, which hold about the same proportion of shares voted in corporate
elections, is also “significant.”
2. Undermined by Lack of Big Three Coordination?
Mallow and Novick also argue that investment managers do not coordinate
their voting, and that as a result, there is considerable variation in their voting
decisions.75 They explain that Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
would require investors who collectively held more than 5% of a company’s
shares to file a Form 13D if they coordinated their approach to voting that
company’s shares.76 Because of difficulties that this would entail for the
investment fund manager, they “have a strong incentive not to coordinate with
each other on voting specific company shares.”77 Mallow also points to evidence
we present to support his claim that “in practice asset managers do not
coordinate their voting.”78
Both Mallow and Novick argue that there is substantial variation in the voting
behavior of asset managers.79 Lacaille has also advanced a similar claim, arguing

spotlight-executive-compensation-the-role-of-public-company-shareholders-april-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PK7T-WFD4] (suggesting that proxy advisors could influence between
15% and 25% of shareholder votes cast on say-on-pay proposals).
74
See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) (concluding that ISS recommendations influence
between 6% and 10% of shareholder votes).
75
See Mallow, supra note 8, at 22-25 (demonstrating that there is significant variation in
voting across asset managers, in part because asset managers do not coordinate their votes);
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 5 (explaining that “index fund managers are
discouraged, by virtue of the regulatory hurdles they would encounter, from telling
management what to do and from coordinating stewardship activities with other managers”).
76
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b) (2021); see also Mallow, supra note 8, at 24 (“If two or
more holders coordinate their approach to voting specific company shares, they . . . need to
jointly file disclosures with the Securities and Exchange Commission if they together hold
more than 5% of a company . . . .”); Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 16 (explaining
that “[e]ligibility to file Schedule 13G is a key reason why index fund managers do not
coordinate voting of proxies, as doing so would require they file Schedule 13D instead”).
77
Mallow, supra note 8, at 25.
78
Id. (citing Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 7-8, 73-74, 10203).
79
For instance, Mallow claims that “there is significant variation in voting across asset
managers of all types and sizes.” See Mallow, supra note 8, at 23. Similarly, Novick explains
that “different asset managers vote differently.” See Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7,
at 11.
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that each of the Big Three vote differently from each other.80 The implication of
this claim is that observers should not aggregate the voting power of the Big
Three. For instance, if BlackRock and Vanguard each held about 5% of votes at
a particular corporation and voted in different ways on a proposal at that
corporation, then their voting decisions would effectively cancel each other out
and not influence the outcome of the vote.
However, while the votes of the Big Three are generally not identical, they
are significantly correlated. In part, this is because the incentives that we identify
apply to all of the Big Three and therefore result in similar voting policies and
individual voting decisions.81 Consistent with the prediction of this analysis, two
studies of investment manager voting have found that the Big Three’s votes are
closely correlated with each other and less correlated with the votes of other
investment managers.
Ryan Bubb and Emiliano Catan use investment manager voting data to
generate a “spatial map” of the voting behavior of different investment
managers.82 They find that investment manager voting behavior is clustered into
three groups of investment managers with similar voting behavior—referred to
as “parties”—with each party following a distinctive philosophy concerning
corporate governance and the role of shareholders.83 Professors Bubb and Catan
find that BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA are all members of the same party,
which they refer to as the “Traditional Governance Party.”84
In a second study, Patrick Bolton, Tao Li, Enrichetta Ravina, and Howard
Rosenthal use investment manager voting records to identify the “ideology” of
different investors.85 They find that BlackRock and Vanguard not only share the
same (center-right) ideology but that the views of both are similarly “more
profit-oriented and more management-disciplinarian.”86 Both studies therefore
find that the voting behavior of each of the Big Three is closely correlated with
the others and much less correlated with the voting behavior of other investors.

80

See Lacaille Video, supra note 9, at 55:10-55:18 (stating that the Big Three “also vote
differently from one another, and those who’ve studied this, I think, have observed that the
Big Three take different viewpoints on important issues”).
81
For a discussion of these incentives, see infra Part IV.
82
See generally Ryan Bubb & Emiliano M. Catan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds,
35 REV. FIN. STUD. 2839 (2022).
83
See id. at 2840-41 (identifying three “parties”: Traditional Governance Party,
Shareholder Reform Party, and Shareholder Protest Party).
84
See id. at 2841 (describing funds in the Traditional Governance Party—including the
Big Three—as “distinctly deferential to management on issues that are traditionally
understood as a matter for the board, and not shareholders, to decide”).
85
See generally Patrick Bolton, Tao Li, Enrichetta Ravina & Howard Rosenthal, Investor
Ideology, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 320 (2020).
86
Id. at 322. Bolton, Li, Ravina, and Rosenthal also find that BlackRock and Vanguard
have similar “ideal points,” which are different from those of proxy advisors ISS and Glass,
Lewis & Co. (“Glass Lewis”) and presumably other investors (SSGA is not mentioned in
these analyses). See id. at 333.
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As a result, it makes sense to aggregate the voting power of the Big Three in
order to properly understand their power.
In our own prior work, we provide evidence that each of the Big Three is more
deferential to corporate managers on votes on executive compensation than are
the three largest active managers: Capital Group, Fidelity Investments, Inc., and
T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.87 That data shows that the frequency of “no” votes
by the Big Three in say-on-pay proposals evaluating executive compensation
plans is less than half (and closer to one-third) of the frequency of the largest
three active managers.88 This finding is not just driven by the voting behavior of
the three largest active managers; the same result is obtained from comparing
the Big Three’s voting to the ten largest active managers.89
Indeed, Novick herself presents data on the level of support of different
investment managers for shareholder proposals.90 This data provides further
evidence of the substantial correlation in the voting behavior of the Big Three.
BlackRock and Vanguard have the lowest level of support for shareholder
proposals, at 15% and 17% respectively.91 SSGA’s level of support is higher, at
29%, but was still 13th out of 19 investment managers listed—separated by only
four investment managers from BlackRock and Vanguard at 18th and 19th.92
3. Curtailed by the Infrequency of Close Votes?
A third argument put forward by Mallow and Novick, as well as by Professors
Kahan and Rock, downplays the voting power of the Big Three by arguing that
the infrequency of close votes in corporate elections means that even a voting
bloc of 20% does not give the Big Three much influence over corporate
outcomes.93 Both Novick and Mallow present evidence of the proportion of
Russell 3000 direct elections that were won by margins above and below 30%
and 10%.94 Novick draws the conclusion that “no individual manager has

87

See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2093.
See id. at 2093 tbl.6 (showing that, on average, the Big Three voted against an average
3.1% of say-on-pay votes between 2012 and 2018, compared to 9.0% for the largest three
active managers).
89
See id. (showing that, on average, the ten largest active mangers voted against 9.1% of
say-on-pay votes between 2012 and 2018).
90
See Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 11 exhibit 8 (presenting data regarding
support for Russell 3000 shareholder proposals for selected investment managers for the
period from July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
For instance, Novick states that “[i]n reality, very few votes are contentious.” Id. at 7.
Mallow argues that there is a limited number of circumstances in which any of the Big Three
could operate as “a swing vote.” Mallow, supra note 8, at 20.
94
See Mallow, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that 95% of Russell 3000 director elections are
won by a margin greater than 30% and less than 1% of Russell 3000 director elections are
won or lost by a margin greater than 10%); Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 7-8
88
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anything close to a swing vote.”95 Similarly, Professors Kahan and Rock argue
that “[t]he number of potentially consequential individual contests” is very
small.96 However, these arguments regarding close votes suffer from two serious
problems.
To begin, there are important situations where the voting decisions of index
fund managers do have a significant impact on whether the vote passes or not.97
For example, in 2015 there was a proxy contest at E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company (“DuPont”), when Trian Partners, L.P. nominated directors to contest
the election against the incumbent directors.98 All of the Big Three voted in favor
of the incumbent directors rather than the nominees put forward by Trian
Partners, and none of Trian Partners’ nominees were elected.99 The margin
between the Trian Partners nominee receiving the most votes (Nelson Peltz) and
the DuPont nominee receiving the fewest votes (Lois Juliber) was 53.8 million
votes.100 At the time of the meeting, BlackRock held 57.2 million DuPont shares,
and Vanguard held 50.1 million shares.101 Had either BlackRock or Vanguard
voted for Nelson Peltz then he would have been elected.102
The voting decisions of the Big Three can also be decisive in shareholder
proposals. As BlackRock’s own data shows, it regularly votes against many
shareholder proposals.103 BlackRock and Vanguard have among the lowest

(presenting data on how many Russell 3000 votes on management proposals are won or lost
by a 10% or 30% margin).
95
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 8.
96
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1777-78 (stating that most of BlackRock’s votes
cast in 2019 had no significant effect on firm value).
97
This is consistent with the observation of Kahan and Rock, who note there are a “small
number of high-profile proxy contests” where institutional investor efforts “are likely to affect
firm value.” Id.
98
See generally E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar.
23, 2015).
99
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM UPDATE: DUPONT
ANNOUNCES
VICTORY
IN
PROXY
FIGHT
WITH
TRIAN
1
(2015),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Shareholder_Activism_U
pdate.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QTM-4VYJ] (“DuPont announced . . . that all 12 of its
incumbent directors were reelected . . . . DuPont’s three largest institutional shareholders, The
Vanguard Group, Blackrock, Inc. and State Street Corporation, all voted in favor of DuPont’s
slate.”).
100
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K/A) 2-3 (June 9, 2015)
(indicating that Peltz received 320.2 million votes, and Juliber received 374.0 million votes).
101
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 98, at 35.
102
Although Vanguard’s holding of 50.1 million shares was less than Peltz’s margin of
defeat, if Vanguard did vote for one or more of the DuPont nominees, then switching from
that nominee to Peltz would have created a swing of double its shareholding, or approximately
100.2 million votes.
103
See Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 11 exhibit 8 (listing support by various
investment managers for shareholder proposals at Russell 3000 companies in 2019 and
showing BlackRock as having the lowest level of support of the group).
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levels of support for shareholder proposals of any of the largest investors.104
BlackRock and Vanguard have rarely supported shareholder proposals
requesting changes in the social and environmental policies or disclosures of
their portfolio companies.105
Furthermore, even without support from BlackRock or Vanguard, many
proposals nonetheless receive substantial support from other investors. For
instance, BlackRock and Vanguard generally vote against disclosure of political
spending and lobbying activity, but many of these proposals receive substantial
support from shareholders.106 At Exxon’s annual meeting in 2019, a shareholder
proposal in favor of lobbying transparency received the support of 37% of votes
cast.107 Had BlackRock and Vanguard both voted their sizable stakes in favor of
that proposal it would have passed.108
A report by Morningstar provides evidence of the potential effect of
BlackRock and Vanguard’s voting decisions.109 The report identified 23
shareholder proposals that failed by 10% or less.110 Either BlackRock or
Vanguard voted against all of these proposals, and both of them voted against
20 of the 23 proposals.111 In all of these cases, either or both BlackRock and
Vanguard held positions of more than 5% of the company’s stock and often held
more than 10% of the company’s stock.112 Therefore, had either BlackRock or
Vanguard switched their vote to support the proposal, it would have passed.
Moreover, in many cases, even proposals that obtain substantial support but
are not successful can create significant pressure for directors and managers to
respond to shareholder concerns. Both of the two largest proxy advisors have
policies to apply extra scrutiny to board actions where substantial minorities
have voted for shareholder proposals or against management proposals.113
104

See MORNINGSTAR, PROXY VOTING BY 50 U.S. FUND FAMILIES 8 exhibit 3 (2020)
(listing Vanguard and BlackRock as fourth- and fifth-least-supportive fund groups during
2015 through 2019); see also Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 11 exhibit 8 (showing
Vanguard as having the second-lowest level of support for shareholder proposals at Russell
3000 companies in 2019, after BlackRock).
105
For evidence of BlackRock and Vanguard’s limited support of social and
environmental proposals, see Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L.
217, 225-28, 244 (2018); and MORNINGSTAR, supra note 104, at 12-14.
106
For data on BlackRock and Vanguard’s voting behavior on proposals regarding
political spending, see Hirst, supra note 105, at 226-27, 244.
107
See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 104, at 22.
108
See id.
109
See id. at 23 exhibit 11.
110
See id.
111
See id.
112
See id.
113
See GLASS LEWIS, 2022 UNITED STATES POLICY GUIDELINES 19 (2022),
https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/US-Voting-Guidelines-US-GL2022.pdf?hsCtaTracking=257fcf1c-f11e-4835-81a3-d13fbc7b1f4c%7C1dad2378-213f45f6-8509-788274627609 [https://perma.cc/43U7-2CZ2] (describing expectations when at
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Accordingly, advisors often advise companies that they should regard say-onpay votes where less than 80% of shareholders vote in favor as a strong negative
signal, requiring some response by directors.114 Consistent with this advice, a
study by Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and David Oesch found that “firms
generally respond to high voting dissent” on say-on-pay votes, even where firms
received majority support.115 Of the companies in that study that received
between 70% and 75% support on say-on-pay proposals, 32% responded with
changes to their compensation plans.116 And of the firms receiving between 65%
and 70% support, 72% responded with changes.117
As discussed in Section I.A, the Big Three collectively held, on average,
24.9% of the votes cast at annual meetings of S&P 500 companies in 2021.118
Had all of the Big Three switched from supporting a say-on-pay proposal to
withholding, the proposal would be in the range of those described by Professors
Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch, where directors are likely to respond with changes.119
The substantial holdings of the Big Three thus give them the power to exert
substantial influence over directors and managers through their voting decisions,
irrespective of the decisions of other investors.
B.

The Effect of Vote Results on Corporate Outcomes

Mallow and Novick also argue that even if the Big Three were able to exert
significant influence on the outcomes of shareholder votes, those vote outcomes
have limited effects on how corporations are managed.120 They give two reasons
least 20% of votes are cast in favor of a shareholder proposal or against a management
proposal); ISS, UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 12 (2021),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MV36-2ZE5] (describing ISS responses where a say-on-pay vote received
less than 70% of votes cast).
114
See, e.g., Edward A. Hauder, Exequity, LLP, Bouncing Back from a Low Say-on-Pay
Vote, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/05/bouncing-back-from-a-low-say-on-pay-vote/
[https://perma.cc/4J84-L7ZL] (“If your company’s say-on-pay . . . vote received less than
80% support, you will need to respond appropriately in next year’s proxy . . . .”).
115
See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy
Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RSCH. 951, 983-86 (2013).
116
See id. at 985 fig.1.
117
See id.
118
See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
119
See Ertimur et al., supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
120
For arguments by Mallow and Novick that shareholder votes are merely advisory, see
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 5 (arguing that say-on-pay votes are advisory
votes); and Mallow, supra note 8, at 28 (pointing out that say-on-pay votes are “non-binding,
advisory” votes). For arguments that corporations are managed by directors, executives, and
advisors, see Mallow, supra note 8, at 28 (arguing that compensation is determined by a board
committee, on the advice of advisors, and that 90% of large U.S. public companies hire such
advisors); and Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 5 (highlighting the role of
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for this, which we discuss in turn: that many votes are merely advisory; and that
directors, executives, and their advisors are the ones who determine how the
corporation will be managed.
First, Mallow and Novick argue that say-on-pay proposals are merely
advisory, and therefore, even if BlackRock or others were to cause those
proposals to fail, directors and managers would not be required to follow the
recommendation of the vote.121 Mallow and Novick are correct in pointing out
that say-on-pay votes are not binding.122 However, negative say-on-pay votes
can still have a significant impact. Directors and managers prefer to avoid vote
outcomes that indicate a significant lack of support, even if those proposals
nonetheless pass.123 In deciding which compensation arrangements to approve,
directors are therefore likely to have regard for the level of support that those
compensation arrangements are expected to receive in future say-on-pay votes.
That is, directors are likely to avoid compensation arrangements that they expect
will attract significant opposition in future say-on-pay votes, or to otherwise take
steps to avoid such opposition.124
Second, Mallow and Novick argue that corporate decisions are not made by
shareholders, but instead are made by directors, managers, and advisors.125 As a
result, rather than most U.S. corporations being substantially influenced by the
Big Three through their very large shareholdings, Mallow and Novick argue that
there are thousands of individuals who collectively manage these corporations.
Novick states that “there are over 28,000 unique individuals involved in running
and setting strategy at US companies.”126 Mallow elaborates, explaining that
these include “approximately 3,900 CEOs . . . and 24,100 board directors.”127
However, this overlooks an important fact regarding the power of
shareholders in general and the Big Three in particular. Shareholders have
significant influence because they can ultimately remove directors.128 Directors
management, the role of the board, and how the board engages with people like compensation
consultants in discussing how public companies are run).
121
See Mallow, supra note 8, at 28; Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 5.
122
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2021) (requiring corporations to include advisory votes on
executive compensation).
123
See, e.g., Hauder, supra note 114 (advisors often advise companies that they should
regard say-on-pay votes where less than 80% of shareholders vote in favor as a strong negative
signal).
124
See, e.g., David Whissel, MacKenzie Partners, Inc., Responding to a Negative Say-onPay Outcome (Oct. 27, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/10/27/preparing-forand-responding-to-a-negative-say-on-pay-outcome/ [https://perma.cc/Z75J-TCLD] (advising
corporations to plan ahead to “overcome the setback of a negative recommendation and earn
the support of their investors” and emphasizing the importance of “responsive action”
following a negative say-on-pay vote).
125
See Mallow, supra note 8, at 28; Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 5.
126
Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 5.
127
Mallow, supra note 8, at 29.
128
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
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wish to retain the support of shareholders, and especially large shareholders, to
reduce the odds of a challenge to directors by an activist hedge fund, which could
ultimately lead to a proxy contest.129 As a result, the decisions of the thousands
of directors that Mallow and Novick mention are made against the background
of those directors’ incentives not to make choices that would be viewed
unfavorably by BlackRock, SSGA, or Vanguard. This discourages decisions by
directors that they believe would be viewed unfavorably by these major
investors.
III. MARKET PERCEPTIONS OF BIG THREE POWER
Thus far this Article has focused on the substantial power and influence of the
Big Three over corporate managers and on addressing claims by Mallow and
Novick that the Big Three’s influence may not be so significant. In this Part, we
turn from the actuality of the Big Three’s power to the perception of the Big
Three’s power by market participants. Considering market participants’
perceptions of the Big Three’s power is important for two reasons. First, market
participants are likely to be rational and well-informed and to have strong
incentives to clearly understand the power of other market actors. There is thus
a substantial likelihood that their perceptions provide a telling account of the
actual power of the Big Three.
Furthermore, and importantly, even disregarding the accuracy of market
participants’ perceptions of the Big Three’s power, those perceptions themselves
function to give power and influence to the positions and practices of the Big
Three. If market participants perceive the Big Three as having substantial power
and influence, then that perception will increase the actual power and influence
of the Big Three, as issuers and advisors will give considerable attention to the
preferences, policies, and positions of the Big Three. Section III.A below
therefore examines evidence of other market participants’ perceptions of the Big
Three’s power. Section III.B then discusses the Big Three’s own
communications which, we show, recognize the very power that Big Three
officers now seek to deny in challenging our work.
A.

Communications by Management Advisors

This Section considers how those who advise corporate directors and
executives—lawyers, governance advisors, proxy solicitors, investment
bankers, and others—consider the power and influence of the Big Three.
Statements made by these advisors commonly reflect, explicitly or implicitly,
680-82 (2007) (describing the critical role of shareholders’ ability to replace directors in
corporate law).
129
For a review of research on hedge fund activism, see Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Rongchen
Li, Governance by Persuasion: Hedge Fund Activism and Market-based Shareholder
Influence (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. – Fin. Working Paper No. 797, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3991289
[https://perma.cc/88PZKTT5].
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their recognition of the Big Three’s power. This recognition is reflected in the
close attention that these advisors pay to the actions and policy statements of the
Big Three and the great frequency and considerable detail with which they bring
these actions and statements to the attention of corporate managers.130
As this Section documents, each time one of the Big Three revises its voting
guidelines, issues a policy statement, or sends a letter to a group of portfolio
companies, law firms and other advisors release memos to their clients
describing and analyzing such actions; this focus dwarfs the attention these
advisors pay to other investors. This is illustrated, for example, in the particular
attention that management advisors have paid to recent changes in the Big
Three’s policies to provide greater support for ESG proposals, and in some
cases, to engage with directors and executives to promote corporate changes
regarding environmental and social objectives.
Lawyers advising corporate managers have spoken clearly on the power and
influence of the Big Three. An interview with prominent lawyer Martin Lipton
describes his view that “[t]he large stakes held by [the Big Three], along with
their long-term investment horizons, make them a centerpiece of good
governance.”131 Other prominent law firms have echoed this sentiment.132
Accordingly, law firms pay close attention to changes in the Big Three’s
policies, as well as their engagement and voting behavior. In an annex to a client
memo concerning changes in voting policies and decisions by investors, law

130

See infra notes 131-51.
John Jannarone, Martin Lipton Says Latest Steps by Big Institutions Align Well with
“The
New
Paradigm,”
YAHOO!
FIN.
(May
13,
2019),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-martin-lipton-says-vanguard-202453971.html
[https://perma.cc/LC3S-HUPG].
132
For example, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP states that:
Concentration of equity ownership, particularly among the largest three index fund
providers, continues to be a key component in the activism landscape. As of December
2018, one of BlackRock, Vanguard or State Street was the largest shareholder in 438 of
the S&P 500 companies, roughly 88%, and collectively the three firms owned 18.7% of
all shares in the S&P 500.
Melissa Sawyer, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Annual Review and Analysis of 2019 U.S.
Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/20/annual-review-and-analysis-of-2019-u-sshareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/5MK2-EA3L]. Kirkland & Ellis has also emphasized
the “position of strength” of the Big Three, stating that “BlackRock, State Street and
Vanguard—the three largest ‘passive’ managers—now control approximately 20 percent of
the value of the S&P 500 and collectively constitute the single largest shareholder in almost
90 percent of S&P 500 firms.” David Feirstein, Sarkis Jebejian & Shaun J. Mathew, Kirkland
& Ellis LLP, Purpose, Culture and Long-Term Value—Not Just a Headline, HARV. L. SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Feb.
26,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/26/purpose-culture-and-long-term-value-not-justa-headline/ [https://perma.cc/PV9U-JB5L].
131
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firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz lists 15 different investors’ policies.133 But
the body of the memo discusses only SSGA and Vanguard and spends a majority
of its discussion on an in-depth analysis of their policies.134 Many law firms
publish releases describing the annual letters issued by the Big Three.135 Many
law firms have also published releases describing changes in the Big Three’s

133

See Andrew R. Brownstein, Sabastian V. Niles & Justin C. Nowell, Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, Institutional Investors Signal: A Mix of Tougher Standards and Heightened
Flexibility for the 2020 Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 2,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/02/institutional-investors-signal-a-mix-oftougher-standards-and-heightened-flexibility-for-the-2020-proxy-season/
[https://perma.cc/N3HK-BKHV].
134
Id.
135
See, e.g., Ning Chiu, Davis Polk & Wardell LLP, State Street and Corporate Culture
Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE. (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/04/state-street-and-corporate-culture-engagement/
[https://perma.cc/C4Z8-F3TM] (summarizing SSGA’s letter to board members); David A.
Katz & Laura McIntosh, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Sustainability in the Spotlight,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Jan.
27,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/27/sustainability-in-the-spotlight/
[https://perma.cc/92DX-LDW3] (analyzing BlackRock’s 2020 letter to CEOs); Holly J.
Gregory, Sidley Austin LLP, Looking Ahead: Key Trends in Corporate Governance, HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Jan.
10,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/10/looking-ahead-key-trends-in-corporategovernance/ [https://perma.cc/7PJY-LV5K] (referencing BlackRock’s annual letter to
CEOs); Amy Simmerman & Katherine Henderson, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, A
Guidebook to Boardroom Governance Issues, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov.
8,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/08/a-guidebook-to-boardroomgovernance-issues/ [https://perma.cc/7PJY-LV5K] (referencing BlackRock’s recent annual
letters to CEOs ); Pamela L. Marcogliese, Elizabeth K. Bieber & Brennan K. Halloran, Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Synthesizing the Messages from BlackRock, State Street, and
T. Rowe Price, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/28/synthesizing-the-messages-from-blackrockstate-street-and-t-rowe-price/ [https://perma.cc/39E3-6B3B] (referencing BlackRock and
SSGA’s letters to companies).
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policies, engagement, and voting on topics such as board composition,136 board
diversity,137 and environmental matters.138
136
See, e.g., Sabastian V. Niles, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Board Development and
Director Succession Planning in the Age of Shareholder Activism, Engagement and
Stewardship, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 7, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/07/board-development-and-director-successionplanning-in-the-age-of-shareholder-activism-engagement-and-stewardship/
[https://perma.cc/GR5Y-V2C7] (summarizing BlackRock, SSGA, and Vanguard’s
commentary on board development); Marc S. Gerber, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, US Corporate Governance: Turning Up the Heat, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/10/us-corporategovernance-turning-up-the-heat/ [https://perma.cc/B2FE-LJK6] (describing Vanguard’s
“concern over [board composition] as an economic imperative” and BlackRock’s voting
guidelines, which state that “it expects to see at least two female directors on every board”).
137
See, e.g., Gail Weinstein, Warren S. de Wied & Philip Richter, Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson LLP, The Road Ahead for Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 13, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/13/the-roadahead-for-shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/5S7M-GVG7] (noting that several
institutional investors, including BlackRock and SSGA, have added board diversity to their
voting policies); Betty Moy Huber & Paula H. Simpkins, Davis Polk & Wardell LLP, Women
Board Seats in Russell 3000 Pass the 20% Mark, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Oct. 5, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/05/women-board-seats-in-russell3000-pass-the-20-mark/ [https://perma.cc/L8VL-CE77] (commenting on the Big Three’s
recent release of their annual stewardship reports and noting that “some report their voting
record against directors on boards that fail to meet certain standards”); Andrew Brownstein,
Steven Rosenblum & Victor Goldfeld, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Mergers and
Acquisitions—2019, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/15/mergers-and-acquisitions-2019/
[https://perma.cc/NK7Y-ZXJE] (noting that several institutional investors, including
BlackRock and SSGA, now include board diversity in their voting policies); Douglas Schnell,
Lisa Stimmell & Jose Macias, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Preparing for the 2020
Reporting Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE. (Dec. 26, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/26/preparing-for-the-2020-reporting-season/
[https://perma.cc/F6MF-5GBY] (citing engagement by SSGA and BlackRock as examples of
different stakeholders making gender diversity on public boards a priority).
138
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Ising & Gillian McPhee, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Considerations for 2020 Proxy Statement Preparations, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 20, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/20/considerationsfor-2020-proxy-statement-preparations/
[https://perma.cc/77WZ-9QAJ]
(describing
comments by BlackRock CEO Larry Fink regarding disclosure of climate-related risks);
William Savitt, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Tectonic Forces to Watch in Corporate
Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/30/tectonic-forces-to-watch-in-corporate-litigation/
[https://perma.cc/83QX-WAMV] (noting increasing calls from influential investors,
including Blackrock, for “more robust disclosure of climate risk, and more corporate action
to address it”); Catherine M. Clarkin, Melissa Sawyer & Joshua L. Levin,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, The Rise of Standardized ESG Disclosure Frameworks in the
United States, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 22, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/22/the-rise-of-standardized-esg-disclosure-
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Governance advisors who assist managers in engaging with investors and in
preparing disclosures for investors have also called attention to the importance
and influence of the Big Three and closely followed changes in Big Three
policies and activities. For instance, leading governance advisor CamberView
Partners (now PJT Camberview) stated in 2017 that “passive investors are
increasingly important” because “one of the three biggest index funds
(BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street) is the largest single shareholder in 88%
of companies in [the S&P 500] index.”139 As a result of this power, CamberView
explains, the topics of concern to the Big Three have become “a critical focal
point in activism campaigns.”140
CamberView also describes how the voting decisions of the Big Three have
become central to say-on-pay votes, with changes in the Big Three’s voting
policies “heighten[ing] the need to engage with investors to bring them
along.”141 CamberView and other governance advisors—such as Ernst & Young
(“EY”), PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), and Deloitte—have paid close
attention to the annual letters released by the Big Three regarding their
priorities,142 as well as on particular changes in the Big Three’s voting policies,

frameworks-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/FDH9-CJQX] (mentioning trend of
institutional investors, including BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA, indicating support of
companies making ESG disclosures).
139
Peter Michelsen & Derek Zaba, CamberView Partners, LLC, The Rise of InvestorCentric Activism Defense Strategy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/25/the-rise-of-investor-centric-activism-defensestrategy/ [https://perma.cc/L5ZG-9N9Q].
140
Id.
141
Chris Wightman & David Martin, CamberView Partners LLC, The Investor View on
Executive Compensation in 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/18/the-investor-view-on-executive-compensationin-2018/ [https://perma.cc/Z2LY-WKLB] (discussing impact of changes in SSGA’s voting
policies on executive compensation).
142
See, e.g., Abe M. Friedman, CamberView Partners, LLC, BlackRock’s Call for
Companies to Deliver Financial & Social Value, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERANCE
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/06/blackrocks-call-for-companiesto-deliver-financial-social-value/ [https://perma.cc/X3BG-6F7F] (discussing BlackRock’s
2018 annual letter to CEOs); Steve Klemash, Jennifer Lee & Amy Brachio, EY Ctr. for Bd.
Matters, Board Members Preparedness for Major Risk Event Like COVID-19, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 6, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/06/boardmembers-preparedness-for-major-risk-event-like-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/59FM-MNTB]
(discussing BlackRock’s 2020 annual letter to CEOs).
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engagement, and voting decisions on topics such as board composition,143 board
diversity,144 and the environment.145

143

See, e.g., Paula Loop & Paul DeNicola, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Investors and
Board Composition, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/26/investors-and-board-composition/
[https://perma.cc/JV56-2AJC] (explaining how some institutional investors have expressed
concern about board composition and providing BlackRock and SSGA’s views on topic);
Ruby Sharma & Ann Yerger, Ernst & Young LLP, Three Things Nominating Committees
Need to Know, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 14, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/14/three-things-nominating-committees-need-toknow/ [https://perma.cc/5L49-AGE8] (describing how institutional investors are increasingly
concerned with board composition and citing BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA materials to
support).
144
See, e.g., Chuck Callan & Paul DeNicola, Broadridge Fin. Sols., Inc. & PwC, 2019
Proxy Season Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/28/2019-proxy-season-review/
[https://perma.cc/8V4D-S2PQ] (discussing SSGA and BlackRock’s engagement with board
diversity); Deb DeHaas, Linda Akutagawa & Skip Spriggs, Deloitte LLP, Missing Pieces
Report: The 2018 Board Diversity Census of Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Feb.
5,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/05/missing-pieces-report-the-2018-boarddiversity-census-of-women-and-minorities-on-fortune-500-boards/ [https://perma.cc/Z5MJUN46] (referencing BlackRock’s 2018 letter to Russell 1000 companies with fewer than two
women on their boards asking them to explain their “lack of progress”); Friedman, supra note
142 (discussing BlackRock’s annual letter which emphasized that boards “should include a
diversity of gender, ethnicities, experience and ways of thinking”); Mark Manoff & Stephen
W. Klemash, EY, 2017 Proxy Season Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July
9,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/09/2017-proxy-season-review/
[https://perma.cc/LFG2-GRP6] (referencing SSGA’s new guidance designed to increase
number of women on boards).
145
See, e.g., Abe Friedman & Robert McCormick, CamberView Partners, BlackRock’s
2017-2018 Engagement Priorities, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (March 17,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/17/blackrocks-2017-2018-engagementpriorities/ [https://perma.cc/E438-99R3] (discussing BlackRock’s 2017-2018 engagement
priorities which emphasize that it “expects all directors of companies that are significantly
exposed to climate risk to be ‘climate competent’”); Manoff & Klemash, supra note 144
(explaining that “BlackRock and State Street . . . have made clear that environmental issues
are integral to their stewardship activities”); Paula Loop, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
Insights from PwC’s 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/31/insights-frompwcs-2017-annual-corporate-directors-survey/ [https://perma.cc/XY8P-ZEAJ] (describing
the effect of support from BlackRock and Vanguard on the success of shareholder proposals
on environmental issues); Jennifer Burns, Christine Robinson & Kristen Sullivan,
Deloitte & Touche LLP, The Atmosphere for Climate-Change Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 5, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/05/theatmosphere-for-climate-change-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/SJR9-LKLU] (discussing
BlackRock’s statement that they “will be increasingly disposed to vote against management
and board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on sustainabilityrelated disclosures and the business practices and plans underlying them”).
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In advising their clients, investment banks have also emphasized the power
of the Big Three, and, with it, the importance of the Big Three’s activities. For
instance, in a release describing activism developments in 2018, investment
bank Lazard stated that the “[i]nfluence of passive investors continued to
strengthen as Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street now own ~18% of the S&P
500 vs. ~14% in 2012.”146 In other releases Lazard emphasized the influence of
the Big Three in proxy contests, describing a proxy contest involving Taubman
Centers, Inc., in which “[c]ompany engagement with Vanguard and BlackRock
reportedly swung the . . . proxy contest in management’s favor.”147 Lazard has
also emphasized the importance of the Big Three’s focus on corporate purpose
and their ESG efforts.148
Finally, we note that even proxy advisors ISS and Glass, Lewis & Co. (“Glass
Lewis”), who advise investors but have considerable influence on the corporate
governance landscape as a whole, have devoted particular attention to the Big
Three’s policies, voting, and engagement on environmental and social issues.
ISS discussed the importance of BlackRock’s focus on sustainable investment
and the likely effect that BlackRock’s new focus would have because of
BlackRock’s size.149 Both ISS and Glass Lewis commented on BlackRock’s

146
Jim Rossman, Lazard, Lazard’s 1Q 2018 Activism Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERANCE (Apr. 20, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/20/lazards-1q-2018activism-review/ [https://perma.cc/S77T-7J3M].
147
Jim Rossman, Lazard, Review of Shareholder Activism—1H 2017, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 25, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/25/review-ofshareholder-activism-1h-2017/ [https://perma.cc/4V8U-R8Q7].
148
For Lazard releases discussing the Big Three’s focus on corporate purpose, see Jim
Rossman, Lazard, Lazard’s 1Q 2019 Activism Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Apr. 22, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/22/lazards-1q-2019activism-review/ [https://perma.cc/YZM7-488X] (discussing how “[p]assive managers are
using their increasing influence to discuss how corporate culture and purpose can affect longterm performance” and referencing BlackRock and SSGA statements as illustrations); Jim
Rossman, Lazard, 2018 Review of Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Jan. 28, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/28/2018-review-ofshareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/7GX6-QB8N] (“BlackRock’s Larry Fink set the tone
for the year, calling on companies to identify and follow through on their social purpose.”);
and Rossman, supra note 146 (referencing the growing ownership stake of the Big Three in
S&P 500 companies and stating how “ESG issues have attracted significant attention by
passive investors, who are pushing companies to serve a broader social purpose in their
communities”). For a Lazard release focusing on the Big Three’s ESG efforts, see Rossman,
supra note 146 (“Increasing importance has driven these firms to materially expand their ESG
efforts, with BlackRock pledging to double its stewardship team’s headcount and Vanguard
establishing a European stewardship presence.”).
149
See Michael Laff, BlackRock Announces New Strategy of Sustainable Investing, ISS:
INSIGHTS (Mar. 16, 2020), https://insights.issgovernance.com/posts/blackrock-announcesnew-strategy-of-sustainable-investing/ [https://perma.cc/39UC-QMEM].
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engagement with firearms manufacturers and retailers.150 Both proxy advisors
have also commented on SSGA’s engagements with issuers regarding board
diversity, as well as on the voting policies and practices of BlackRock,
Vanguard, and SSGA in supporting increased board diversity.151
The above discussion highlights the considerable frequency and detail with
which lawyers, governance advisors, investment bankers, and proxy advisors
pay attention to and advise their clients on the Big Three’s policy changes,
voting guidelines and behavior, and engagement efforts. These advisors clearly
attach considerable importance to the power and influence of the Big Three, and
this importance could well be transmitted to the managers of the companies in
which the Big Three invest.
These releases are phrased as statements of fact and analyses of consequences
rather than as detailed substantive consideration of the merits of the Big Three’s
decisions. This is because the releases are not concerned with any intellectual
innovation underlying the Big Three’s actions; instead, they are merely
concerned with the fact of those actions themselves and the power and influence
of the actors making them. The attention that these actions receive, both from
advisors and from the general media, demonstrates the importance that the
market attaches to them.
This attention is reserved for the Big Three; advisors do not pay such attention
to changes in the voting guidelines or policies of other institutional investors.
For instance, as Section III.B describes, the California State Teachers’
Retirement System (“CalSTRS”) has been advocating for greater gender
diversity on corporate boards since 2009 and has received limited attention from
advisors and the media.152 But the announcement by SSGA and BlackRock that
gender diversity on boards would become one of their primary focal points
generated considerable media coverage and garnered close attention and
150

See, e.g., Damien Fruchart, Michael Jenks & Verena Simmel, ISS, Firearms—Investor
Responses amid Political Inaction, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/09/firearms-investor-responses-amid-politicalinaction/ [https://perma.cc/JAC8-GUV7] (discussing BlackRock’s announcement of its
engagement with firearms manufacturers and retailers); Courteney Keatinge, Glass,
Lewis & Co., Investor Pressure on Firearms Manufacturers, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Mar. 18, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/18/investorpressure-on-firearms-manufacturers/ [https://perma.cc/5QRG-ANCE].
151
See Brianna Castro, Glass, Lewis & Co., Raising the Stakes on Board Gender Diversity,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Jan.
8,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/08/raising-the-stakes-on-board-gender-diversity/
[https://perma.cc/9B2T-APQP] (commenting on SSGA’s engagement campaign and voting
regarding board diversity, BlackRock’s support for board diversity proposals, and Vanguard’s
letter advocating for greater board diversity); Subodh Mishra, ISS, Governance Improvements
in 2017, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/11/29/governance-improvements-in-2017/
[https://perma.cc/L5EV-TVGG] (describing SSGA, BlackRock, and Vanguard’s actions and
policies supporting board diversity).
152
See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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analysis from corporate advisors, both far beyond what the positions of CalSTRS
ever attracted.153 The focus of advisors and the media on the Big Three—far
more than on any other investors—is not because they are the first to address
these issues, but because of the considerable power and influence they wield.
B.

The Big Three’s Own Communications

While the Big Three have generally sought to downplay their power, they also
make claims about the successes and impact of their stewardship programs that
are premised on corporations’ viewing them as having power. These claims of
success, which are the focus of this Section, are inconsistent with and undermine
the Big Three’s claims seeking to downplay their power.
Each of the Big Three claims that their engagements have had significant
impact. For instance, about one-third of BlackRock’s 2019 Investor Stewardship
Report is devoted to “[e]ngagement and voting case studies” that describe
various ways in which BlackRock has engaged with corporations and the impact
that its engagements have had.154 SSGA devotes an entire section of its
Stewardship Report for 2018-2019 to the “Impact of [its] Stewardship: Voting
and Engagement Stories.”155 And Vanguard’s 2019 Stewardship Report is
interspersed with many anecdotes about how Vanguard’s engagements
influenced the directors and executives of its portfolio corporations to address
Vanguard’s concerns.156
Three examples from BlackRock’s own descriptions of its engagements serve
to demonstrate its influence. First, BlackRock states: “In the US, director board
commitments have been a longstanding engagement topic. We believe the focus
on this topic has contributed to the reduction in the average number of boards
on which directors sit . . . .”157 BlackRock provides evidence to support this
claim: “[T]he percentage of non-CEO directors sitting on more than four boards
has decreased from 8.8% in 2008 to 6.7% in 2019. In addition, more than threequarters of S&P 500 boards have established some limit on their directors’
ability to accept other corporate directorships, an increase from 56% in 2008.”158

153

See supra notes 137, 144 and accompanying text.
See BLACKROCK, 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 10-22 (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJG9-MTJW].
155
See STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, STEWARDSHIP REPORT 2018-19, at 80-87 (2019),
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2019/09/annualasset-stewardship-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FW9-XSQN].
156
See VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 15, 21, 25, 27
(2019), https://www.wlrk.com/files/2019/Vanguard_2019_Annual_Report_Investment_Ste
wardship.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGC9-J4A3] (referencing and discussing engagements on
board composition, strategy and risk, executive compensation, and governance structures).
157
BLACKROCK, supra note 154, at 11.
158
Id. (footnote omitted).
154
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Second, BlackRock describes its “engage[ments] with many companies for
multiple years on the relationship between board diversity and board
effectiveness.”159 BlackRock explains:
In 2018, [it] sent a letter to the companies within the Russell 1000
(approximately 30%) that had fewer than two women on their board. [In
2019], [it] began voting against the re-election of directors . . . at
companies that did not publish a clear policy on board diversity or that
hadn’t improved diversity in the boardroom.160
BlackRock then points to improvements in boardroom diversity and explains
that “[i]n our view, the acceleration in the increase in the number of women on
public company boards is, in part, attributable to the engagement undertaken by
investors, including voting on director elections.”161
Finally, BlackRock explains how it engages with management in situations
where another shareholder “uses its equity stake in a corporation to pressure
management to make changes to the company’s governance, operations, or
strategy.”162 BlackRock “highlight[s] an example of an engagement that
improved the terms offered to shareholders during an unusual reverse merger
transaction,” which involved “multiple engagements . . . and involved a number
of conversations with management of the private company, various external
advisors of the private company, and the two public companies party to the
transaction.”163 Following these engagements, BlackRock explains, the
companies put forward a
revised deal [which] provided a US $5 billion overall value-add when
compared to the original valuation. Additionally, the company agreed to
appoint a new independent board member. Our engagements and the
resulting value-add to this contested situation underscores [BlackRock’s]
role as an investment function focused on delivering value for our
clients.164
Each of the Big Three make similar claims that their engagements with their
portfolio companies have had significant effects on those companies. How can
their engagement have such effect? It can only be because the directors and
executives of those portfolio companies believe that the Big Three have
significant power and therefore prefer to take the courses of action that the Big
Three prefer.
Consider the example of gender diversity on corporate boards, mentioned
among BlackRock’s success stories above. SSGA has also devoted significant
attention and engagement to its “Fearless Girl Campaign” for positive change
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
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on gender diversity, which it refers to as a “Core Campaign Focus.”165 In
describing “The Impact of Fearless Girl in 2018/19,” SSGA explains that
[a]fter two years of productive engagements and voting, we are delighted
to report that since the introduction of Fearless Girl in March 2017, 577
companies or approximately 43% of the companies we identified have
responded to our call by adding a female director, with another six having
committed to do so.166
SSGA thus suggests that their campaign has had a significant impact on the
representation of women on boards. Assuming that this is correct, how were they
able to have such an effect? A number of other institutional investors before
them have attempted to advance the representation of women on corporate
boards. For instance, starting in 2009, CalSTRS put forward a number of
shareholder proposals seeking greater board diversity.167 In 2014, CalSTRS
wrote letters to the 131 companies in its portfolio that had no women on their
boards, offering to help improve board diversity.168 However, at least according
to BlackRock and SSGA, their engagement on the issue of board diversity has
had a much greater effect. This is consistent with the power and influence that
comes from the Big Three’s substantial stakes.
Just as the Big Three’s decisions to push for reforms such as increased board
diversity can have a substantial impact on their portfolio companies, the Big
Three must recognize that their decisions not to push for improvements on other
matters also have an effect on their portfolio companies and the corporate
governance of those companies. Many of those changes are more likely to take
place if the Big Three actively exercise their power and influence to support
those changes. To take just one example, the voting policies of the Big Three
currently support annual elections, and the Big Three generally vote to support
shareholder proposals pushing for annual elections when they are put forward at
companies.169 However, 1,157 companies in the Russell 3000 (39% of such
companies) had staggered boards rather than annual elections in 2019.170
Had the Big Three taken a more active stance in favor of annual elections,
rather than simply supporting proposals put forward by others, there may have
165

STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, supra note 155, at 34.
Id. at 36.
167
See Firms Answer CalSTRS Call for Increased Diversity on Boards, CALSTRS (Nov.
20, 2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20200831103343/https://www.calstrs.com/newsrelease/firms-answer-calstrs-call-increased-diversity-boards.
168
See CalSTRS Gets Rapid Response to Board Diversity Effort, CISION PRWEB (Aug. 28,
2014), https://www.prweb.com/releases/2014/08/prweb12129836.htm [https://perma.cc/9Z7
Y-LTN9].
169
For the Big Three’s voting guidelines expressing broad support for proposals to
introduce annual elections, see Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2103
& n.193. For the Big Three’s voting support for annual elections, see id. at 2103-04 (finding
that BlackRock, SSGA, and Vanguard voted in favor of a majority of proposals to introduce
annual elections from 2014 to 2018).
170
Id. at 2104 (citing data as of June 30, 2019).
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been greater moves towards annual elections. For instance, the Big Three could
have threatened to withhold support from certain directors on any boards that
did not have annual elections, as BlackRock and SSGA did for boards with no
women directors.171 Such a move is likely to have led to more corporations
moving to annual elections. That more companies have not moved to annual
elections cannot therefore be due to a lack of power on the part of the Big Three;
rather, it is due to the Big Three’s choice not to use the substantial power they
have.
IV. DISTORTED INCENTIVES
Thus far this Article has focused on the power of the Big Three. We now turn
to our concern that the Big Three’s use of this power is seriously afflicted by
two serious incentive problems. This Part discusses each of these two incentive
problems in turn, along with the counterarguments (or lack thereof) presented
by academic commentators and the Big Three themselves.
We begin in Section IV.A with the Big Three’s incentive to underinvest in
stewardship. Section IV.B then considers the incentive of the Big Three to be
excessively deferential to corporate managers.
A.

Underinvestment in Stewardship

1. The Underinvestment Problem
One type of undesirable incentive that we analyzed in detail in Index Fund
Incentives concerns the incentive of each of the Big Three managers to
underinvest in stewardship compared with the level of investment that would
serve the interests of their beneficial investors.172 Investment in stewardship will
be desirable if, and only if, the marginal gain to that portfolio of the index fund
exceeds the marginal cost of the investment. Even though this level will be
optimal for the fund’s investors, it is likely to be less than the optimal level for
the corporation as a whole because the investors in the fund will only capture a
small portion of gains to the company as a whole. However, even taking this into
account, the substantial size of the index fund managers’ stake may justify a
similarly substantial investment in stewardship. But our analysis showed that the
Big Three are likely to invest substantially less in stewardship than the amount
that would be optimal for the fund’s investors.
This is because the investment manager’s sole return from investing in
stewardship comes from a potential increase in their fee income from the assets

171
See supra notes 159-61, 165-66 and accompanying text (regarding BlackRock and
SSGA’s engagements on board diversity).
172
For a discussion of index fund incentives to underinvest in stewardship, see Bebchuk
& Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2050-59. For additional discussion, see
Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, Agency Problems, supra note 5, at 96-97 (discussing incentives of
index funds to invest much less on stewardship than would be value-maximizing for their
portfolio).
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they manage. And the percentage of the assets under management charged by
the Big Three in fees is very small. The average fees charged by BlackRock,
Vanguard, and SSGA in 2020 were 0.25%, 0.09%, and 0.16%, respectively.173
Therefore, if BlackRock were to undertake stewardship activities that brought
about an increase in the value of its portfolio by $1 million, BlackRock would
earn an extra $2,500 in fees. If the increase could be sustained for some time,
BlackRock could earn this additional amount for several years. But even if that
is the case, the amount that BlackRock earns from undertaking stewardship is a
tiny fraction of the $1 million benefit that its stewardship would bring to its
portfolio. It would be optimal from the perspective of investors in the portfolio
to spend up to $1 million to bring about the $1 million increase in the portfolio.
But BlackRock itself will only be willing to invest up to $2,500 in stewardship.
A number of academic commentators have contested the underinvestment
claim or put forward arguments that are inconsistent with it. In this Section, we
consider and respond to four types of objections. First, we respond to arguments
that index fund managers do have incentives to undertake stewardship
(a) because doing so may allow them to compete more effectively with active
managers, (b) because of the size of their portfolios, and (c) because of the
breadth of their portfolios. Then, we turn to the argument that (d) index funds
do not have incentives to undertake stewardship but that their lack of incentive
is natural or appropriate.
2.

Objections Based on Incentives to Attract Additional Funds

The first type of argument against underinvestment that has been raised by
academics critical of our approach is that stewardship might allow index fund
managers to attract additional investments. This is the case because the index
fund managers compete with other investment fund managers based on
returns.174 There is evidence that investors “chase” past returns and may be
willing to move their investments to investment fund managers that have
recently outperformed their competitors.175 Implicit in this claim is that, were
the Big Three to undertake investor stewardship that increased their returns
above that of their competitors, then they could attract additional funds from
investors, which would bring with them greater fee revenue for the index fund
manager. However, investment stewardship by one index fund manager is
unlikely to create any such competitive advantage because funds managed by
other index fund managers will capture exactly the same returns from the

173

See MORNINGSTAR, 2020 U.S. FUND FEE STUDY 15 (2021) (reporting average fees
charged by the Big Three in 2020).
174
See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 32 (explaining that funds compete for investor
assets based not only on fees, but also on performance).
175
For evidence that investors “disproportionately flock to high performing funds,” see
Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 15981601, 1619 (1998).
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stewardship activity.176 This is implicit in the nature of index fund investing;
each index fund holds the same stocks, in the same proportion. So, a gain created
by one manager will be shared by the funds of all managers tracking that index.
If the costs of stewardship were taken into account, the index fund undertaking
the stewardship would perform worse than its competitors.
Thus far our analysis has focused on competition among different index fund
managers. But the same argument will apply to the many actively managed
funds that hold the same stock in the same proportions as index funds, known as
“shadow indexing” or “closet indexing.”177 An index fund undertaking valueincreasing stewardship at a company would also perform worse than active
managers who held a greater proportion of that company’s stock than the
index.178
Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon argue that index fund
managers have incentives to invest in stewardship activities because they
compete for investors’ funds, not only with other index fund managers, but also
with actively managed funds.179 They argue that investing in stewardship
activities will eliminate potential advantages of such actively managed funds
that might otherwise allow them to outperform index fund managers.180
However, even if index fund managers were to invest substantially in
stewardship activities, this would not allow them to compete effectively with
active managers because those same stewardship activities will cause some
active managers to outperform the index fund managers. As noted above, active
managers which disproportionately hold positions in companies that increase in
value as a result of the stewardship activities will outperform the index fund
managers undertaking the stewardship.181 The investment stewardship activities
will therefore not allow the index fund managers to capture any additional
investment assets, and they may actually lose investment assets to the actively

176
For a discussion of the effects of competition among index funds, see Bebchuk & Hirst,
Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2057-58.
177
For evidence that a substantial number of active funds have a high degree of shadow
indexing, see generally K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund
Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009).
178
For the reciprocal claim, that active managers that disproportionately hold positions in
companies that outperform the index will outperform index funds, see Bebchuk & Hirst, Index
Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2059.
179
See Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 32 (arguing that index fund managers compete for
funds “not only with each other but also with . . . active funds”).
180
See id. at 37 (“[Passive funds] lack the active funds’ ability to generate alpha through
investment choices. Passive investors also do not have the firm-specific information or
expertise necessary to address operational issues. Instead, passive investors compete against
active funds by using their voice and seeking to improve corporate governance.”).
181
See supra note 178.
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managed funds that disproportionately hold the companies in which they
undertake stewardship.182
3.

Objections Based on the Size of Big Three Stakes

The second argument against underinvestment in stewardship is that index
funds do have incentives to undertake stewardship because of the significant size
of their holdings. Critics of underinvestment have argued that the large stakes
that index fund managers hold in many companies is sufficient to incentivize
them to undertake stewardship.183 However, this argument is incorrect because
it fails to recognize the very small fraction of the benefits produced by
stewardship that index fund managers capture, due to the very low fees that they
charge.184 Our analysis shows that the small fraction of the benefits that index
fund managers would capture from stewardship would be insufficient to lead
them to invest in stewardship to the level that would best serve the interests of
their own beneficial investors.
4. Objections Based on the Breadth of Index Fund Holdings
A third set of arguments made against underinvestment by academic
commentators relates to the breadth of index funds’ portfolios. One such
argument is that the breadth of index fund portfolios creates economies of scale
for index fund managers that would allow index fund managers to study a
particular issue that is relevant to many companies in their portfolio, thereby
spreading the cost of such study across all affected companies.185 These authors
182

For another criticism of the argument that competition with active funds might lead
index fund managers to undertake stewardship, see generally J.B. Heaton, All You Need Is
Passive: A Response to Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon (July 7, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Boston University Law Review).
183
See Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 35-36 (“The size of the Big Three enables them to
capture outsize benefits from [investments in corporate governance].”); Patrick Jahnke,
Ownership Concentration and Institutional Investors’ Governance Through Voice and Exit,
21 BUS. AND POL. 327, 338 (2019) (“[T]he Big Three asset managers have such large asset
bases . . . that the cost of engagement is minimal when compared to the profits they
generate.”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1785 (noting that because assets managed by
the principal advisors to equity index funds are extraordinarily large,” even index fund
managers’ low fees “generate incentives in the context of voting that compare favorably to
those of most other shareholders”).
184
For a discussion of index fund fee levels, see Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives,
supra note 3, at 2054-56.
185
See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 26 (arguing that passive funds “are able to
aggregate the size of their substantial holdings as well as the information provided by all their
investments and to spread the cost of obtaining information across their entire portfolio”);
Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1801 (arguing that “[i]nvestment advisers whose [assets
under management] include shares in multiple companies benefit from the economies of
scope related to issue-specific information”); Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common
Ownership in an Era of Corporate Compliance, 105 IOWA L. REV. 507, 515-16 (2020)
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implicitly argue that index fund managers will be more likely to undertake
investment stewardship than other investment managers. For example,
Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon suggest that these economies
of scale lead index fund managers to be involved in rulemaking by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).186
Another version of the breadth argument made by academic commentators is
that, because index funds hold stakes in so many corporations, they benefit the
most from “spillover effects” that their stewardship activities at particular
companies may have for other companies in their portfolio. As an example of an
activity that has demonstrated economies of scale, SSGA has cited the effects of
its “thought leadership work” on corporate behavior.187 These arguments
suggest that index fund managers are both well-placed to contribute to corporate
governance improvements in many companies and that they are likely to make
such improvements.188
A third breadth argument, made by Professor Gordon, is that investment
managers have incentives to undertake “systematic stewardship,” by which
Professor Gordon refers to stewardship to reduce the systematic risk across
companies in their portfolios, and thereby increase risk-adjusted portfolio
returns.189 Candidates for such stewardship would include climate change risk,
financial stability risk, and social stability risk.190
These breadth-based objections fail for two reasons. First, there are many
matters in which company-specific information is valuable, such as those
relating to the corporation’s specific business circumstances.191 On these
matters, investors must devote considerable time and attention to the company’s
specific circumstances, and economies of scale are less likely to be relevant.
Similarly, there are some issues that cannot be expected to have significant
spillover effects to other firms, in which broad portfolio holdings will not

(arguing that substantial aggregate ownership by investment managers is “likely to improve
institutional investors’ incentives and ability to monitor companies in which they invest when
dealing with macro legal risks”).
186
See Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 54 (“Passive investors regularly comment upon and
call for change to the rules adopted by the SEC under federal securities laws.”).
187
See, e.g., Constable, supra note 11 (citing a SSGA officer stressing the “extensive
thought-leadership work that [SSGA] believes influences corporate behavior”).
188
See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 39 (“Passive investors are well-placed to
evaluate such provisions and to determine whether these provisions are likely, as a general
matter, to increase or decrease firm value at the majority of portfolio companies. They are
also more likely to internalize any spillover effects that may arise from governance
provisions.” (footnote omitted)).
189
See Gordon, supra note 14, at 13 (describing systematic stewardship as focusing on
reducing systematic risk to increase risk-adjusted portfolio returns).
190
See id. at 28-32 (describing candidates for systematic stewardship).
191
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2090 (describing
company-specific information required for stewardship decisions).
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provide greater incentives to undertake stewardship. Professors Kahan and
Rock, in particular, acknowledge these points.192
Second, our empirical evidence also provides a response regarding those
types of activities for which there are economies of scale and for those activities
that might provide spillover benefits to other portfolio companies. We agree that
undertaking stewardship on these matters would be advantageous for the
beneficial investors in index funds. However, the empirical evidence that we
present in prior work shows that index fund managers do not undertake some of
these activities at all, and they undertake other activities only in a very small
proportion of their portfolio companies. That evidence shows that index fund
managers do not, for instance, put forward shareholder proposals and do not
contribute substantially to corporate governance legal reforms.193 This is despite
the fact that other organizations have achieved significant economies of scale
through submitting shareholder proposals and regularly contribute to corporate
governance reforms.194
Those economies of scale also mean that these tools could be very effective
in reducing climate risk, financial stability risk, or social stability risk across the
portfolios of index fund managers. Other work has shown that the Big Three,
despite having portfolios that are the most diversified of all portfolios—and thus,
presumably, the greatest incentive to reduce systematic risk—actually vote in
favor of shareholder proposals addressing climate change risk much less often
than many managers of less-diversified, actively managed portfolios.195 The
only activity that index fund managers do undertake at any scale is private
engagement, and the evidence that we present suggests that the scale is much
192
See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1800 (“The information required to cast an
informed vote can be divided into two categories: company-specific information and issuespecific information.”).
193
See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2101-05 (describing
evidence that the Big Three did not submit any shareholder proposals on corporate governance
matters between 2014 and 2018); id. at 2105-12 (describing evidence that the Big Three
submitted many fewer comment letters on SEC rulemaking proposals than pension funds with
much smaller amounts of assets under management and did not submit any amicus briefs in
important cases regarding corporate governance).
194
For a description of economies of scale achieved by some organizations in submitting
shareholder proposals, see Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate
Gadflies, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 569, 586-88 (2021) (describing the substantial number of
shareholder proposals submitted by the Shareholder Rights Project, the Boardroom
Accountability Project, and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Union). For evidence of
the contribution of other organizations to corporate governance reforms, see Bebchuk & Hirst,
Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2105-12.
195
Jackie Cook & Tom Lauricella, How Big Fund Families Voted on Climate Change:
2020
Edition,
MORNINGSTAR
(Sept.
28,
2020),
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1002749/how-big-fund-families-voted-on-climatechange-2020-edition [https://perma.cc/JS7Q-VHJL] (presenting evidence that BlackRock,
Vanguard, and SSGA supported 12%, 15%, and 32% of votes, respectively, on key 2020
climate resolutions, compared to 30% and 19% by active managers American Funds and
Fidelity, respectively).
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more limited than commentators would suggest.196 This supports, rather than
contests, our argument that index fund managers have incentives to underinvest
in stewardship.
5. Objections Based on Lack of Skills and Expertise
A fourth and different argument made by some of those taking issue with our
conclusions is that index fund managers lack the skills and expertise necessary
to consider the specific business circumstances of the portfolio companies they
invest in.197 For instance, Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon
consider whether “passive investors will seek to identify and address firmspecific operational deficiencies”; they conclude that such investors “lack the
expertise and the resources to do so effectively.”198 Professor Gordon similarly
argues that the cost constraints of the business models of index fund managers
“limit [their] capacity to do ‘deep dive’ analysis for many firms in the
portfolio.”199
However, these arguments ignore the fact that index fund managers have the
resources to improve their skills and expertise, such as through hiring expert
staff. If they wished to do so, they would be able to obtain the expertise and
personnel necessary to undertake such analyses and stewardship. That they do
not have such expertise and personnel should not be regarded as a given fact of
nature, but rather as the product of choices made by the Big Three managers.
These choices, in turn, are shaped by the incentives to underinvest in stewardship
that our analysis identified. Thus, our academic critics are not justified in arguing
that these incentives are not a serious concern because the Big Three lack the
skills and expertise to pay close attention to company-specific dimensions
anyway. It is the Big Three’s incentives to underinvest, and their resulting
choices to limit investments in skills and expertise, that are responsible for the
Big Three’s limited monitoring of their portfolio companies.
B.

Incentives To Be Excessively Deferential
Many of the stewardship decisions of index fund managers involve choices
whether or not to defer to the views and preferences of the managers of their
portfolio companies. These include whether to vote on director elections,
compensation matters, and shareholder proposals in the way that the managers
196
For empirical evidence of the Big Three’s private engagements, see Bebchuk & Hirst,
Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2084-88.
197
See, e.g., Charles M. Nathan, On Governance: Institutional Investor Engagement: One
Size Does Not Fit All, CONF. BD. (July 18, 2018), https://www.conferenceboard.org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=6826 [https://perma.cc/Y8JP-NRXJ] (explaining that the
Big Three’s stewardship teams “are principally focused on big picture [ESG] issues . . . [and]
lack the skill-sets and manpower necessary to deal in depth with company specific issues of
strategy design and implementation, capital allocation, M&A opportunities, and operational
and financial performance”).
198
Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 43.
199
Gordon, supra note 14, at 36.
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of the corporation would prefer; whether to submit shareholder proposals to the
company; and the index fund manager’s choice of principles, practices, and
policies, such as their voting guidelines. In many cases, where the preferences
of managers are likely to be value-enhancing for the company, it would be best
for the index fund manager to defer to those preferences. However, there may
be some circumstances where deference to corporate managers may not be
value-enhancing for the company, and where it would thus be better for the
beneficial investors of the index fund that the index fund manager not defer to
the preferences of corporate managers.
As we explained in detail in Index Fund Incentives, Big Three managers (as
well as some other investment fund managers) have strong incentives to be
excessively deferential to the preferences of corporate managers.200 The reason
is that index fund managers bear particular private costs from nondeference.
Where these costs are greater than the fraction of the increase in the value of the
corporation that the index fund manager is likely to capture, then the index fund
manager will have an incentive to be deferential, even though this is not in the
interests of their own investors.
One important factor that encourages Big Three managers to be excessively
deferential to corporate managers is driven by significant business ties that the
Big Three have with the companies in which they hold positions. The Big Three
managers obtain substantial revenues from administering and managing the
defined contribution plans (“401(k) plans”) of many of their portfolio
companies. Big Three managers could reasonably believe that if corporate
managers viewed an index fund manager negatively, including because of the
index fund manager’s nondeference, then the index fund manager’s revenue
could also be negatively affected. This could lead to client favoritism, whereby
index fund managers are more deferential to current or potential clients. More
importantly, there could be general management favoritism, whereby index fund
managers are deferential not just to their own clients, but to corporate managers
in general.
The Big Three senior officers challenging the agency-costs account of their
stewardship have denied the significance of the above concerns but have not
provided an adequate basis for this position. For example, in one response to our
arguments regarding non-deference reported by the Financial Times, Rakhi
Kumar, the former Managing Director of Environmental, Social, and
Governance Investments and Asset Stewardship at SSGA, expressed doubt with
respect to our excessive deference concerns, stating that “I doubt you would be
able to find a company that says State Street is a pushover.”201 Kumar’s

200

See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2059-71; see also
Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, Agency Problems, supra note 5, at 101-04 (discussing private costs
to index funds from opposing corporate managers).
201
Walker, supra note 11.
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argument was echoed by SSGA’s then CIO Richard Lacaille, who denied that
SSGA is in any way reluctant to vote against management.202
However, Kumar’s above response fails to recognize that, even if corporate
managers were to consider SSGA to be a “pushover,” those managers would be
better served by not stating that belief or questioning the effectiveness of the
investor oversight to which they are subject. Similarly, Lacaille’s response does
not engage with the empirical evidence that SSGA—as well as other Big Three
managers—generally display substantial deference in their voting decisions on
executive compensation as well as other matters.203
BlackRock’s Mallow also dismisses the influence of potential conflicts of
interest on stewardship decisions. He argues that BlackRock recognizes the
potential for these conflicts and manages them, including both by maintaining
the independence of its engagement group and by implementing policies to
identify and mitigate potential conflicts.204 In support of this claim, Mallow cites
not only BlackRock’s own conflict policies, but also those of SSGA, both of
which seek to implement internal “walls” to manage conflicts.205
Mallow’s arguments also fail to engage with the evidence on the voting
decisions of Big Three managers and the substantial deference they display.
Furthermore, and importantly, Mallow’s focus on the Big Three procedures
aimed at addressing conflicts fail to recognize that these procedures are designed
to address the problem of client favoritism but cannot address the more
important problem of general management favoritism. Because general
management favoritism does not involve favoritism towards particular clients,
it cannot be addressed by ethical walls and other mechanisms intended to address
client favoritism.
Professors Kahan and Rock, as well as Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and
Davidoff Solomon, acknowledge our concern regarding conflicts of interest.
Professors Kahan and Rock recognize the incentives that the business operations
of investment managers create for them not “to antagonize potential banking or
insurance clients or companies that may engage them to run their pension funds”
with their voting activities.206 Similarly, Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and

202
See Lacaille Video, supra note 9, at 59:35-1:00:20 (“We’re quite comfortable with
voting against management. . . . I think that there’s a perception that if we vote against
management, it somehow makes life difficult for us. We’ve done it. I’ve done it. . . . We’ve
voted against the board in a disagreement with them on some issue, and it hasn’t damaged the
relationship. . . . The idea that that would somehow be an incentive for an excessive
deference . . . doesn’t stack up.”).
203
The evidence of index fund manager engagement that we present in Index Fund
Incentives is generally consistent with the excessive deference hypothesis. See
Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2075-116.
204
See Mallow, supra note 8, at 30.
205
Id. at 30 n.139 (citing sources providing BlackRock and SSGA’s policies on prohibiting
stewardship team from disclosing voting decisions to employees not involved in proxy
voting).
206
Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1809.
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Davidoff Solomon also acknowledge the possibility of potential conflicts arising
from the business ties of investment managers, stating that “potential business
ties between sponsors and companies’ management may aﬀect passive funds’
voting behavior” and “create the risk that [investment managers] will vote the
shares of their funds in favor of management rather than in the best interests of
the fund shareholders.”207 However, these academic critics do not provide any
support for believing that this problem is not substantial and do not meaningfully
engage with the evidence on voting behavior that suggests this problem is
consequential.
Whereas these critics of the agency-costs account fail to give adequate weight
to the contribution of business ties between Big Three managers and their
portfolio companies, they at least acknowledge this source of deference
incentives. Importantly, however, these critics fail to address two other factors
that contribute to the Big Three’s tendency to be excessively deferential to
corporate managers.
One such factor is the interest of Big Three managers in avoiding activities
that could require them to file Schedule 13D disclosures, which would impose
considerable private costs.208 Where an investor obtains more than 5% of a
public company, Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act requires that it
file certain disclosures, either on Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G.209
Nondeferential actions that may be construed as having “the purpose [or] the
effect of changing or influencing . . . control” of the company require filing on
Schedule 13D.210 However, filing on Schedule 13D must be done much more
frequently and requires much greater detail than filing on Schedule 13G.211
Because of the size and breadth of investment managers’ holdings, all of which
are subject to this disclosure, nondeference that requires filing on Schedule 13D
would impose substantial costs on them.
In addition, possibly the most important factor that induces Big Three
managers to be deferential to corporate managers, and one which is not
addressed by the critics of our agency-costs account, is the private interest that
the Big Three have in reducing the risk of public and political backlash against
them.212 The Big Three’s dominant role in the growing index fund market gives
207

Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 65.
For a discussion of how requirements to file Schedule 13D forms lead to excessive
deference, see Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2065-66.
209
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2021).
210
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i).
211
Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Schedule 13D), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-102
(Schedule 13G). Schedule 13D must be filed within ten days after every acquisition and
subsequent change in holdings, compared to once per year for Schedule 13G. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-1(a), (b)(2). Schedule 13D filings also require particularized disclosure of each
acquisition for each entity, compared to disclosure of aggregated positions for Schedule 13G.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Schedule 13D); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-102 (Schedule 13G).
212
For a detailed discussion of how fear of backlash encourages deference, see Bebchuk
& Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2066-70.
208
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them a lot to lose.213 Similar concentrations of financial power have led to public
and political backlash in the past.214 The considerable power of corporate
managers means that they could help provoke such a backlash against the Big
Three if the Big Three’s investor stewardship appeared likely to constrain the
power, authority, compensation, or other private interests of corporate managers.
The Big Three could limit these risks by being deferential to corporate managers.
This factor is likely to contribute substantially to the pro-management voting
patterns of the Big Three that have been documented.215
Finally, we would like to discuss the implications of our discussion of
excessive deference for Professor Gordon’s analysis of the “systematic
stewardship” of the Big Three.216 Recall that Professor Gordon presents a
favorable view of Big Three stewardship on the grounds that the Big Three are
able to produce (and do in fact produce) substantial benefits by focusing on
general, systematic issues that are relevant to companies at large, such as
environmental and social issues.217
Professor Gordon correctly argues that the system-wide nature of these issues
enable the Big Three to produce benefits without expending substantial costs per
company and that Big Three stewardship with respect to such issues is thus not
undermined by the incentives to underinvest that we identified.218 However,
Professor Gordon fails to recognize that, even though the environmental and
social stewardship of the Big Three is not undermined by incentives not to spend
considerable resources on stewardship, such stewardship is undermined by the
Big Three’s incentives to be deferential to corporate managers. Because of these
incentives, the Big Three should not be expected to push companies to make
changes in their operations that corporate leaders strongly prefer to avoid.
To be sure, the Big Three have incentives to be perceived as good stewards
in order to appeal to some of their beneficial investors. Furthermore, the Big
Three have incentives to make their power seem acceptable and to reduce the
odds of a backlash, by creating an impression that their use of power is primarily
used to advance general goals that are widely supported, such as combating the
risks of climate change and increasing gender and racial diversity. However,
while the above considerations give the Big Three incentives to be viewed by
their customers and the public as seeking to advance such causes, they will not
213

For a discussion of the Big Three’s current dominant market position and its likely
durability, see supra Part I.
214
For a history of backlash against concentrated financial power, see generally Mark J.
Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998).
215
For evidence of the promanagement voting patterns of the Big Three, see supra notes
81-92 and accompanying text.
216
See Gordon, supra note 14, at 13-24 (advocating for certain kinds of systematic
stewardship by investment managers, but not discussing their incentives to be excessively
deferential to corporate managers).
217
See id. at 24-32 (describing the nature of systematic risk and providing “candidate
risks” for targeting by institutional investors).
218
See supra Section IV.A.1.
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necessarily cause the Big Three to produce actual changes that corporate
managers would strongly resist.
The above analysis indicates that the environmental and social stewardship of
the Big Three is likely to be long on rhetoric and puffery but short on producing
actual and meaningful changes. Our analysis of Big Three activities in recent
years indicates that Big Three stewardship in this area has focused substantially
on inducing companies to make more expansive disclosures in this area.219
Corporate managers have not strongly resisted such expanded disclosure
requirements, and changes to disclosure requirements do not necessarily lead
corporate managers to make any changes in how they actually operate the
company. Thus, although the systematic stewardship advocated and supported
by Professor Gordon is not undermined by Big Three incentives to limit
stewardship expenditures, Big Three incentives to be deferential and
accommodating to corporate managers cast substantial doubt on the potential
benefits of such stewardship.
*****
This Part has explained the two different sets of incentives that are likely to
distort the investment stewardship activities of the Big Three. Part V turns to
explain how the combination of these incentives and the substantial power of the
Big Three significantly raises the stakes in the debate over the agency-costs
account of Big Three stewardship.
V.

THE STAKES

This Part examines what is at stake in the debate over our agency-costs
account of Big Three stewardship. We explain below that there are three main
reasons why the power and incentives of the Big Three matters. Section V.A
explains the promise of the concentrated ownership and power held by the Big
Three and how that promise will go unfulfilled if the Big Three avoid the
responsibility that comes with their concentrated power. Section V.B explains
that, in contrast to many other areas of corporate governance, if the Big Three
shirk this responsibility, the corrective mechanisms by which investors could
influence them to exercise their responsibility are very limited. Section V.C
explains how the failure of the Big Three to use their power worsens the agency
problems of corporate managers by insulating them from investor challenge.
Finally, Section V.D explains why the Big Three have incentives to downplay
219

This analysis was based on our review of both the voting record of the Big Three with
respect to social and environmental shareholder proposals (available on FactSet) and the
annual engagement reports of each of the Big Three managers. See BLACKROCK, supra note
154, at 11-13, 16-19 (discussing BlackRock’s efforts to engage with companies regarding
board diversity and climate risk, including efforts to increase disclosures about these issues);
STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, supra note 155, at 33-42 (reporting SSGA’s efforts to increase
disclosures related to climate risk and gender diversity); VANGUARD, supra note 156, at 23
(discussing the importance of disclosure frameworks).

1594

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:1547

their power, and why it is, therefore, important that scholars and policymakers
see through their efforts to do so.
A.

The Unfulfilled Promise of Reconcentrated Ownership

The main problem with the Big Three’s investor stewardship is that it leaves
unfulfilled the promise of reconcentrated ownership. In their classic 1930 book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means described how the ownership of most large U.S. corporations was heavily
dispersed among many small investors.220 The small stakes held by investors
meant that they had limited ability to influence the outcome of corporate
elections, and also that their share of any gains from increasing the value of the
corporation would be similarly small.221 As a result, dispersed investors did not
have incentives to invest in improving the value of the corporation. And to the
extent that managers suffer from agency problems, these would be
unconstrained by investors.
We do not claim that index fund stewardship is worse than stewardship by
others or than the level of stewardship in a world of dispersed owners, such as
that described by Berle and Means. In earlier work with Alma Cohen, we
suggested that the increasing concentration of ownership by institutional
investors offers promise that the structural problems of dispersed ownership
could be overcome and that the agency problems of corporate managers could
be constrained.222 As investors’ stakes grow, those investors will have a greater
ability to undertake stewardship and influence managers to make valueincreasing changes. And as their stakes grow, the returns to investors from
undertaking such stewardship will also be greater, giving them greater incentive
to undertake such stewardship.
The growing stakes of institutional investors therefore offer the promise of
investors that will have both the ability and the incentive to constrain the agency
problems of corporate managers. The large stakes in most large U.S.
corporations held by the Big Three represent the apotheosis of this promise. As
we have explained in Section II.A, the Big Three now hold the power to
constrain the agency problems of corporate managers and to influence those
managers to maximize the value of the corporations they manage.
The analysis of the incentives of index fund managers in Part IV shows that
the Big Three have incentives not to deliver on the promise. While index fund
managers have the power to influence corporate directors, they have incentives
not to use this power to maximize the value of the corporations they invest in,
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See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
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but rather to defer excessively to corporate managers and to underinvest in
stewardship. The problem with the incentives of the Big Three is thus that they
leave the promise of their concentrated ownership unfulfilled.
B.

Lack of Corrective Mechanisms

The problem created by the Big Three’s power and distorted incentives
matters even more because of the lack of a corrective mechanism. We believe
that this is a problem that has so far been largely overlooked in the debate
regarding investor stewardship that we have discussed. This Section first
explains how market mechanisms generally operate in other parts of the
corporate and investment landscape to correct and improve managers’ actions.
It then explains why those mechanisms are not likely to function effectively with
respect to the investor stewardship decisions of the Big Three and the impact
this has on investor stewardship.
A fundamental principle of neoclassical economics is that well-functioning
markets contain corrective mechanisms that lead underperforming market
participants to either improve or be eliminated.223 In competitive product
markets, firms that produce goods and services that are less desirable to
consumers than those of their competitors will lose their share of the market to
those competitors. If they do not improve their offerings, then the
underperforming firms will eventually be driven out of business. Similarly,
companies that have returns worse than those of their competitors will have a
higher cost of capital, and their managers will face pressure from their investors
to improve their performance. If they do not improve, there is a threat that the
managers may be replaced or that the company may be acquired.
However, there is no such market mechanism that would reward the Big
Three for good stewardship decisions and would therefore lead them to improve
their stewardship performance. The financial success of the Big Three depends
on their ability to attract assets from investors who are looking for a manager.
For index funds, this success comes from offering a portfolio of investments that
track a specified index with the lowest possible cost. Success in this competition
is unrelated to the level or quality of the investment stewardship activities of the
index fund manager. Engaging more effectively with corporate managers will
not result in any greater financial success; if that activity is costly, it may actually
reduce the financial success of the index fund manager.224 There is therefore no
market check on the investor stewardship decisions of the Big Three.
This makes the distorted incentives of the Big Three, and their significant
power, a much bigger problem. If there were a market mechanism that would
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For early work discussing corrective mechanisms in markets, see ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY VOLUME bk. 5 (8th ed. 1920) (discussing
general relations of demand, supply, and value).
224
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other index funds using the same index).
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lead to the Big Three improving their investment stewardship there would be
less cause for concern regarding their significant potential power. But the
absence of such a mechanism means that any flaws in the investment
stewardship activities of the Big Three—flaws that are likely to occur, given the
distorted incentives discussed above—will go uncorrected. And their substantial
power means that these flaws are likely to have a significant impact on the
corporate governance landscape.
C.

Insulating Corporate Managers

The importance of the Big Three’s power lies in how it is used with respect
to corporate managers, and in particular, whether it is used to push corporate
managers too much, or too little. As we explained in Section V.A, the Big
Three’s power offers significant promise because it could be used to maximize
the value of the corporations in which they invest. But as Part IV discussed, and
Index Fund Incentives documented, the Big Three are likely to underinvest in
stewardship and to be excessively deferential to corporate managers. This means
that the power of the Big Three is therefore more significant in its absence.
The effect of the Big Three’s choices not to use the full force of their
investment stewardship power to increase the value of corporations is that the
managers of those corporations become effectively insulated from such
improvements in value. If the Big Three do not push those managers to improve
the value of the corporation, and do not support others who might push them to
do so, then there is likely to be very little pressure on managers to take such
actions. That is, if the Big Three defer to managers more than is optimal, then—
because the Big Three are such a substantial part of shareholders as a whole—
shareholders as a whole are also likely to be excessively deferential to managers.
This provides managers with insulation from potential challenges, even when
such insulation is not warranted.
Mallow dismisses these arguments by pointing out that the Big Three promote
their goals through engagement rather than by proxy contests.225 Our focus here
is not only on their lack of proxy contests, but rather on the many ways in which
the Big Three could take actions to increase the value of the corporations in
which they invest, but do not. However, there is clear evidence of a number of
ways in which the Big Three fail to take such actions.
In our earlier work, we provided evidence that the Big Three’s engagements
do not relate to the business performance of the companies that they invest in
and that their engagements do not address the causes of managers’
underperformance.226 Although the identity of the directors of companies can be
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See Mallow, supra note 8, at 30 (“[Vanguard, BlackRock, and SSGA] promote [their]
goals through engagement rather than hostile proxy contests.”).
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See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 2095-97 (finding that
none of the cases of private engagement studied focused on business underperformance and
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withholding votes from directors).
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expected to have a considerable effect on the performance of those companies,
the Big Three also do not communicate with companies regarding directors they
believe should be added to or removed from the board of directors of those
companies.227 And because of the very large number of companies in the
portfolios of the Big Three and the limited resources they devote to stewardship,
they are only able to devote a very small amount of time to each of the companies
in their portfolio.
Indeed, in our prior work we estimate that, as of 2019, BlackRock spent fewer
than four person-days per year, and less than $5,000 in stewardship costs, and
that Vanguard and SSGA spent considerably less.228 The limited amount of time
and resources devoted to each company means they cannot undertake detailed
reviews of those companies in ways that could allow them to apply pressure to
increase the value of those companies.
Because of the insulation this provides to corporate managers, they have an
incentive to maintain this state of affairs. The private interests of such managers
benefit from having the Big Three, which are the three largest shareholders in
numerous large public companies, underinvest in oversight and display
excessive deference to the preferences of corporate managers. However, this
state of affairs is detrimental to corporate performance, and thus, to the interests
of beneficial investors of the Big Three.
D.

The Downplaying of Power

Part I has described the significant power held by the Big Three, and this Part
has described the implications of this power. However, as this Section explains,
the Big Three have incentives to downplay this power and to contest claims of
its significance, like those put forward in this Article. This Section describes
evidence of the Big Three downplaying their power and explains how this is
consistent with our predictions. We also explain why it is important to recognize
the power of the Big Three, and the issues it creates, notwithstanding the Big
Three’s attempts to downplay that power.
Attempts by the Big Three to downplay their power can be seen most clearly
in the claims of Mallow and Novick, themselves. For instance, substantial parts
of Mallow’s paper are devoted to arguing that “[a]sset managers are minority
shareholders with limited voting power and corporate control,” and that there is
no coordination and substantial variation in how asset managers vote, so they
should not be considered as a group.229 Novick’s keynote address starts by
227

See id. at 2097-101 (discussing how the Big Three generally “refrain from
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See id. at 2079.
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see id. at 22-24.
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focusing on how even the Big Three hold a minority of each company’s
shares.230 Later, she explains that very few corporate votes are close enough that
any individual manager—including any of the Big Three—would have a “swing
vote.”231
BlackRock has also attempted to downplay its substantial power, and that of
the Big Three, in general. In an April 2019 release, BlackRock argues that
shareholders are “[d]ispersed and [d]iverse.”232 The release explains that
“[Vanguard, BlackRock, and SSGA] represent a minority position in the $83
trillion global equity market. . . . [T]he combined [assets under management] of
these three managers represents just over 10% of global equity assets.”233 The
release goes on to describe how, even at BlackRock, there are many different
individuals involved in managing these assets, and there are variations in the
way that they vote BlackRock’s shares.234
In another release that same month, BlackRock responded to concerns that
“the growth of index investing will lead to a small handful of individuals
effectively controlling all corporations in the near future.”235 The release focuses
on how many individuals oversee public companies in the U.S.236 It restates
claims made in an earlier release, including that “[i]t is generally not possible
for even the largest shareholders to determine the outcomes of proxy decisions,”
and that “voting records demonstrate significant variation in voting patterns
amongst the largest fund managers.”237
In yet another release, focused on executive compensation, BlackRock
disputes the “claim that index fund managers may wield outsized influence over
230

See Novick Keynote Address, supra note 7, at 2 (“Examining the majority of US public
companies—and certainly ‘large cap’ public companies—the largest shareholder holds only
a single digit percentage of shares outstanding. . . . Furthermore, the Top 10 asset managers
represent only 17% of equity ownership . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
231
Id. at 8 (“However, [the data] demonstrate[s] that no individual manager has anything
close to a swing vote . . . .”).
232
See BLACKROCK, POLICY SPOTLIGHT: SHAREHOLDERS ARE DISPERSED AND DIVERSE 1
(2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-spotlightshareholders-are-dispersed-and-diverse-april-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RQV-R6C4].
233
See id.
234
See id. (“[F]or any individual asset manager, [assets under management] represents a
variety of investment strategies, each with different investment objectives, constraints, and
time horizons. . . . [T]here is often some variation in the way shares are voted across
portfolios, even among those managed by a single asset manager.”).
235
See BLACKROCK, THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 1 (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-spotlight-the-role-ofshareholders-in-public-companies-april-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F5L-GJQJ] (citing
Coates, supra note 15, at 14 (“We are rapidly moving into a world in which the bulk of equity
capital of large companies with dispersed ownership will be owned by a small number of
institutions.”)).
236
See id. (“By our count, more than 28,000 individuals oversee public companies in the
US alone.”).
237
Id. at 2.
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corporations through their proxy voting and engagement.”238 This BlackRock
release argues that “index fund managers are rarely the determining factor in
say-on-pay votes” and that “the focus on say-on-pay is misplaced, since
executive compensation is neither structured nor decided by shareholders,” but
rather by boards of directors, compensation committees, and compensation
consultants.239
We have addressed many of these claims earlier in this Article, but we raise
them again here to demonstrate that BlackRock has consistently sought to
downplay its own power and influence over corporations. That BlackRock seeks
to challenge recognition of their power is consistent with the incentives of the
Big Three described in Part IV. In particular, recognition of the Big Three’s
substantial power puts them at risk of a public and political backlash that could
constrain that power and that could impose substantial costs on the Big Three.240
History provides a number of examples of substantial concentrations of financial
power being met with such regulatory backlash.241 The Big Three therefore have
incentives to downplay and reduce the salience of their power as much as
possible. These incentives explain the recent arguments made by BlackRock
attempting to downplay its power and the power of the Big Three in general.
Because of the importance of the Big Three’s power, it is also important that
this power be recognized and that attempts by the Big Three to downplay this
power be treated with appropriate caution. If the power of the Big Three can be
successfully obscured, then there will be less pressure on them to exercise that
power in the best interests of their own investors. Conversely, broader public
recognition of the power of the Big Three, and recognition of that power by
investors, policymakers, and researchers, will increase scrutiny of how the Big
Three exercise—or fail to exercise—that power, and thereby give the Big Three
incentives to improve how they do so. We hope that this Article may contribute
to such recognition.
CONCLUSION
The Big Three collectively hold more than 20% of the shares of S&P 500
companies and almost 25% of the votes cast at the annual meetings of those
companies. These substantial stakes give them correspondingly significant
voting power, and with it, influence over the managers of the corporations in
which they invest. Their stakes and influence are likely to continue to grow. The
Big Three have attempted to downplay their own power, including in the recent
works of Mallow and Novick. However, the close attention that market
238
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For a well-known, historical account of backlash against financial power, see Roe,
supra note 214, at 32-53. For a discussion of the relevance of such historical examples to the
analysis of index funds, see Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Fund Incentives, supra note 3, at 206770.
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participants pay to the engagements, voting policies, and actual voting behavior
of the Big Three show that they consider the Big Three to have substantial
influence. The Big Three’s own claims regarding the effectiveness of their
engagements are also inconsistent with their own attempts to downplay their
influence.
The Big Three’s significant power and influence represents a potential
problem for corporate governance because of their distorted incentives. The Big
Three have incentives to be more deferential to the managers of the companies
in which they invest than would be optimal for their own investors and to invest
less in stewardship than their own investors would prefer. These incentive
problems mean that the substantial promise of large investors with the power to
influence corporate managers goes unfulfilled. Worse, the deferential actions of
the Big Three insulate corporate managers from challenges by others, and the
structure of the index fund market means that it contains no corrective
mechanism that would lead the Big Three to improve their stewardship
performance.
One mechanism that is important for driving improvements in stewardship by
the Big Three is awareness and recognition of their power and the problems
caused by their distorted incentives. Because the Big Three have incentives to
downplay their power, we should treat their attempts to do so with caution. This
Article has shown the problems with recent arguments made by the Big Three
attempting to downplay their power and has reinforced our earlier conclusions
regarding the substantial power and influence that they do have. We hope that
in doing so, this Article will help contribute to the recognition of the Big Three’s
power and of why it matters.

